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# West Europe Report

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13 FEBRUARY 1987

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

## CONTENTS

## POLITICAL

## FINLAND

Poll on Presidential Favorites: Koivisto, Holkeri, Vayrynen (HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 11 Dec 86).....	1
SKP Organizations' CC, DEVA, Women's SDNL Profiled (TIEDONANTAJA, various dates).....	5
CC Meeting	5
DEVA Described, by Risto Repo	9
SDNL Direction, Independence, by Lena Bjorklund	12

## GREECE

'Underground Currents' Noted in Relations With Turkey (Kyra Adam; KYRIAKATIKI ELEVETHEROTYPIA, 21 Dec 86).....	16
PASOK Errors in Policy, Methodology Stressed (Giorgis Massavetas; KYRIAKATIKI ELEVETHEROTYPIA, 21 Dec 86).....	18
New Policy of Assent Seen Needed for PASOK (KYRIAKATIKI ELEVETHEROTYPIA, 20, 21 Dec 86).....	20
Self Reliance Said Inadequate	20
Reconciliation With Karamanlis Predicted, by Spyros Karatzaferis	22

Currents Within PASOK Said To Express Different Views (KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 21 Dec 86).....	25
Tsokhatzopoulos' Influence Seen Waning (EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA, 23 Dec 86).....	27
Paper Reports on 'Anti-Western Climate' in Media (EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA, 10 Dec 86).....	28

#### SWEDEN

Minister: Government Prepared To Increase Afghanistan Aid (Kaa Eneberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 18 Dec 86).....	29
Poll Shows More Favorable Attitude Toward USSR (DAGENS NYHETER, 19 Dec 86).....	30
Newspapers Take Sides in Increasingly Bitter Defense Debate (SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 18 Dec 86; DAGENS NYHETER, 18, 27 Dec 86).....	31
Conservative Paper Attacks Westerberg, Editorial	31
Liberal Paper Blames Bildt, Editorial	33
Parties' Defense Position Viewed, Editorial	34
Paper Views Olof Johansson as New Center Party Chairman (DAGENS NYHETER, 3 Jan 87).....	36
Some Criticize as 'Passive', by Ake Ekdahl	36
Views on Alliance Unknown, Editorial	39

#### ECONOMIC

#### GREECE

Turkey's Economic Expansion Seen Threatening Nation (Nikos Simou; I KATHIMERINI, 4-5 Jan 87).....	41
Concern Expressed About Domestic Debt (Nikos Nikolaou; I KATHIMERINI, 4-5 Jan 87).....	43
ND's Announced Economic Program Noted (EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA, 23 Dec 86).....	45
Somber Predictions for 1987 Buying Power (Themis Anastasiadis; I KATHIMERINI, 28-29 Dec 86).....	47

Increase in October Private Deposits Reported (I KATHIMERINI, 3 Jan 87).....	51
---	----

## NORWAY

Overview of Economic Problems as Country Enters New Year (AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Dec 86, 5 Jan 87).....	52
Problems Summarized	52
Consciousness of Crisis Necessary, by Cecilie Norland, Morten Wang	53
Oil Price 'Shock' Viewed, by Flemming Dahl, Morten Woldsdal	56
Offshore Industries Hit	57
Oil Production Increased in 1986	59

## MILITARY

## AUSTRIA

Major Combined Arms Training Exercise Tests Area Defense (Josef Pechmann; SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD, Jan 87).....	61
---	----

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Civil Defense Assessed Within National Security Framework (Harald Wust; ZIVILSCHUTZ MAGAZIN, Sep 86).....	66
--	----

## FINLAND

Press Comments on Koivisto's Remarks on NATO Sea Buildup (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 10, 12 Dec 86).....	74
Concern Over Aircraft Carriers, Editorial	74
Demands Finnish Security 'Rethinking', Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson	75
Armed Forces Chief of Staff Urges Voluntary Enlistment of Women (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 15 Dec 86).....	78
Citizens Committee To Draft Report on Alternative Defense (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 14 Dec 86).....	79
Nokia, Valmet To Join in Weapons Production Enterprise (P. Winckelmann-Zilliagus; HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 16 Dec 86).	80

## SWEDEN

Navy, Coast Guard, Home Guard Improve ASW Capabilities (UNDER SVENSK FLAGG, No 11, 1986; MARIN NYTT, No 5, 1986).....	82
Navy's Coastal Corvettes Operational	82
Coast Guard Modernizing, Reorganizing, by Sven Uhler	85
Home Guard Adds Role, by Tord Nyberg	92

## SWITZERLAND

'Trident' Tests Army, Civil Response to Airborne Intrusion (SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD, Jan 87).....	94
Complex Interaction of Components, by Reto Voneschen	94
Praise for NCO Corps, by Josef Feldmann	99
Mobile Antitank Warfare Stressed, by Reto Voneschen	100

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## POLL ON PRESIDENTIAL FAVORITES: KOIVISTO, HOLKERI, VAYRYNEN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Dec 86 p 9

[Article: "HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup Poll: Half of Conservative Party Voters Back Reelection of Koivisto"]

[Text] Very broadly in all segments of the population, people hope that President Mauno Koivisto will be reelected president in the 1988 elections. According to a HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll, at least half of the supporters of all the parties, as well as half of the different age, income and social groups, hope that Koivisto will be elected.

Support for Koivisto is least among Conservative Party voters, but even 50 percent of them hope Koivisto will be elected. Thirty-nine percent of Conservative Party supporters hope that their own party's presidential candidate, Harri Holkeri, will be elected. Among Center Party (KEPU) and SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] voters the gap between Koivisto and their own parties' presidential candidates is clearly greater in favor of Koivisto.

The HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll sounded out citizens' opinions on the choice of a president with two questions.

The first question was phrased: "The next elections in our country following the parliamentary elections will be the presidential elections to be organized in the spring of 1988. Whom do you hope will be elected as our president in the coming elections?"

The respondents were not given any list of possible presidential candidates beforehand, rather each one was allowed to name his favorite himself.

The second question was phrased: "If the person you have just mentioned is not a candidate, whom in that event do you hope will be elected?"

The respondents were not given a prepared list of names in connection with the second question either.

Commissioned by HELSINGIN SANOMAT, the poll was conducted by the Finnish Gallup Company from 13 to 30 November, over a year before the elections. A total of 1,507 people, who were selected by random sampling, were polled. The interviews took place in 103 communities, 57 of which were cities. The

respondents represent the voting age population (18 years or older) outside of Aland.

Holkeri Second, Vayrynen Third

The responses to the first question show that 70 percent of voting age Finns hope that Koivisto will be elected in the 1988 elections. In second place, 11 percent hope that Holkeri will be elected.

The third most desired candidate was Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen. Seven percent of our citizens hope that he will be elected.

Probable SKDL candidate Gov Kalevi Kivisto garnered 2 percent and SDP [Social Democratic Party] chairman, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, 1 percent.

A total of 2 percent of those polled hope that someone else will be elected. The names added up to a long list, but support for each of them was less than 1 percent. Among them are current and former Swedish People's Party (RKP) chairmen [respectively] Christoffer Taxell and Par Stenback as well as the corresponding pair for the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], Pekka and Veikko Vennamo.

The results do not predict the outcome of the next presidential elections, nor even directly that a given respondent also really intends to vote for his presidential candidate's electors in the elections.

The results of the poll reflect citizens' opinions at the end of November as to whom they would like to be elected president. The results may also reflect respondents' preliminary estimates as to whom they will probably choose.

The support figure of 70 percent for Koivisto recorded by the HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll deviates in an upward direction from those of other recent polls. In them a support figure for Koivisto of from 50 to 60 percent is usually recorded.

For example, in an Economic Research Institute poll conducted from 14 to 24 November and published in SUOMEN KUVALEHTI last week, the support figure for Koivisto came to 57 percent. At that time, however, the respondents were asked whom they would vote for to be president. In the HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll the respondents were asked whom they hoped would be elected president.

Since the questions were of clearly different kinds, the support figures cannot be directly compared with one another. Furthermore, in the Economic Research Institute poll the respondents were given a prepared list of names of possible presidential candidates.

Same Questions Asked Before Last Elections

A HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll also measured citizens' hopes just before the last presidential elections in the fall of 1981 with substantially the same questions as this time. The poll was conducted three times in a little under a half a year's time.

In the first poll, 4 months before the elections, 60 percent of all Finns hoped



that Koivisto would be elected. Two months later the figure was 54 percent and a few weeks before the elections 56 percent.

The corresponding figures for the Conservative Party candidate, Harri Holkeri, were 3.12 and 12 percent and 3.12 and 11 percent for the KEPU candidate, Johannes Virolainen.

In the electoral elections Koivisto's electors got over 43 percent of the vote.

#### SDP Supporters Nearly Unanimous

The HELSINGIN SANOMAT Gallup poll that has just now been conducted as anticipated shows that SDP supporters are those who most hope that Koivisto will be elected president in 1988. SDP supporters are nearly unanimous in their choice of Koivisto. The Conservative Party's Holkeri comes in second among SDP supporters, but only slightly -- 3 percent -- below Koivisto, and the SKDL's Kivisto comes in third. Among supporters of all the fairly large parties, Koivisto is clearly the most desired choice for the presidency. He is at least desired among Conservative Party supporters, half of whom hope that Koivisto will be elected and 39 percent of whom hope that Holkeri will be elected. Among KEPU supporters, the difference in support for Koivisto and Vayrynen is now 31 percentage points in favor of Koivisto and in the SKDL the difference between Koivisto and Kivisto is fully 71 percentage points.

RKP supporters raised the Conservative Party's Holkeri to second place after Koivisto. RKP supporters did not hope that Vayrynen would be elected at all.

Vayrynen is the second most desired candidate for the presidency only among KEPU supporters. Kivisto also takes second place among supporters of the Greens as well as among SKDL supporters.

Koivisto is clearly the next president who is most desired in all age, income and social groups. In all the population groups selected by the Gallup Company taken together, the percentage of those who hope Koivisto will be elected does not fall below 50 percent.

Young people seem to hope Koivisto will be elected to a slightly lesser extent than older people do.

Koivisto is slightly more popular with those who have attended [only] elementary school than with those who have had a higher education.

#### If Koivisto Is Not a Candidate

When asked whom their second choice for the candidacy would be in the event that the person cited as their first choice is not a candidate in the 1988 elections, Holkeri and Vayrynen attained equally strong starting positions.

Nineteen percent of Koivisto's supporters hope that Vayrynen will be elected and 19 percent Holkeri if Koivisto is not a candidate. In that event 15 percent hope that Kivisto will be elected and 7 percent that Sorsa will be elected. Fully 33 percent of those who want Koivisto could not name a second-choice candidate.

In the event Paavo Vayrynen is not a candidate, Vayrynen's supporters would elect Koivisto (40 percent) and Holkeri (35 percent). As for Holkeri's supporters, the corresponding figures are: Koivisto, 51 percent, and Vayrynen, 15 percent.

At the time the poll was conducted the KEPU had already officially nominated Vayrynen as its presidential candidate and the Conservative Party nominated Holkeri in the early phase of the poll. At that time too, the SDP proposed Koivisto's candidacy, even though a final decision on the candidate had not been made. At the end of the poll, on 30 November, the SKDL later decided to ask Kivisto to run as a candidate. The nomination of the candidates of the other parties was fully open and above board.

#### Two Most Desired to Be President by Respondents' Party Preferences

<u>Party Preference: Candidates</u>	<u>Percent</u>
SDP supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	92
-- Harri Holkeri	3
Conservative Party supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	50
-- Harri Holkeri	39
KEPU supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	61
-- Paavo Vayrynen	30
SKDL supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	81
-- Kalevi Kivisto	10
RKP supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	65
-- Harri Holkeri	19
Greens supporters:	
-- Mauno Koivisto	66
-- Kalevi Kivisto	7

11,466

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## SKP ORGANIZATIONS' CC, DEVA, WOMEN'S SDNL PROFILED

## CC Meeting

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 25 Nov 86 pp 12-13

[Article: "SKP Organizations' Central Committee Meets; Only DEVA Has Clean Bill of Health in Next Parliamentary Elections"]

[Text] The chief topics of discussion of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Organizations Central Committee that met on the weekend were the elections, the Democratic Alternative's (DEVA) Turku conference, preparations for the 21st SKP (unity) Congress, the Peace Year summary, the situation in the SDNL [Finnish Democratic Youth League], the development of educational and cultural activities and TIEDONANTAJA's circulation efforts.

Engaging in animated discussion rich in content, the Central Committee stressed the importance of the DEVA's first national conference, to be held 2 weeks from now. In its own way it will open a new phase in Finnish politics.

"In their election platforms the consensus parties are trying to dodge the key problems of national policy and their responsibility for the failure of policy over the past few years," SKP Organizations Central Committee chairman Taisto Sinisalo said in his introductory speech.

"A peculiar situation has arisen: In busying themselves with the continuation of a policy that has produced growing unemployment in industry through postelection programs that restrict our social welfare policy, they distribute cheap promises of the "something-for-everyone" sort in their circumspect platforms. The SDP [Social Democratic Party] is the latest to have gotten into this game with its election platform.

"It is no less essential for the SDP than it is for the Center Party -- even for the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] -- to announce its connection with the Conservative Party's nefarious objectives; it is they that are opening the doors to a government coalition with it. This is even happening contrary to the desire of their members as expressed in member surveys."

According to Sinisalo, they plan to sacrifice the interests of wage-earners and pensioners as well as farmers on the altar of big capital's ability to compete. The "controlled regulation of structural changes" is aimed at reducing the

number of jobs and increasing unemployment. Privatization is threatening many achievements.

"The only political force that will be entering the elections with clearcut objectives of changes in political direction is the DEVA. It is proposing a new direction for Finland that is in keeping with the interests of the basic masses of the people. The DEVA election platform has been openly discussed by citizens and will be discussed at the DEVA national conference in Turku 2 weeks from now," Sinisalo said.

"The DEVA will not just hand out promises; it operates on the assumption that a change for the better in the country's policies is only possible through the actions of people desirous of change and cooperation. These actions will be given fresh impetus at the big DEVA conference in Turku."

Sinisalo also reminded his listeners that the DEVA is the only party in whose election platform concrete actions to be performed are presented, aimed at improving Finland's peace policy, which is based on the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact.

#### Eliminate Sales Tax on Food

In his speech Sinisalo also tackled the issue of the SDP's agricultural policy, criticizing the SDP for its demands that "props" be ended, that measures to protect imports be rescinded and that agricultural export subsidies for exports to the Soviet union be cut. They would lead to the death of thousands of small farms, increased unemployment and the collapse of agricultural exports.

Sinisalo also demanded that the sales tax on food be eliminated to lower prices. He felt that in their propaganda both the SDP and the Center Party blame farmers and wage-earners for opposing one another, which is harmful to both of them.

Sinisalo also sharply criticized the tax policy of the government parties and the Conservative Party, which has led to an increasingly intolerable tax burden on wage-earners and people of little means while at the same time giving big business more and more new tax relief measures.

#### Broader Connections

Sinisalo said that DEVA policy has already achieved results as concerns our trade with the Soviets, among other things. They are no longer talking as openly as before about reducing it by 50 percent. According to Sinisalo, from the standpoint of developing the DEVA it continues to be indispensable for them to politically expand and strengthen their base.

"How much our political efforts are based on principles will now be gauged by how extensively we rally forces to the DEVA," Sinisalo emphasized.

#### Peace Movement Expands

Cay Sevón, the organization secretary of the Finnish Peace Defenders, reported to the Central Committee on their Peace Year experiences. He thought that the peace movement had expanded its base this year, especially among the new strata

of the working class. Peace Week rallies and processions were organized in more communities than ever before. They also acquired positive experiences with peace effort possibilities in schools and kindergartens. According to Sevón, the peace efforts of the consumer organizations have proven to be effective.

#### General Discussion

During the general discussion Timo Bergholm spoke about plans to improve CULTURE NOTEBOOKS and a more effective circulation effort. Markku Kangaspuro discussed youth unemployment and considered young Laplanders' occupation of the Labor Ministry to be a good example of an enterprising action.

When he took the floor, Osmo Tolvanen spoke about the Communist effort in the Construction Workers Union and that organization's approaching elections and their importance. Matti Kautto sharply criticized Bror Wahlroos' positions on Finland's agricultural policy. According to Kautto, Wahlroos does not recognize the special features of Finnish agriculture, nor does his estimate reflect the real situation.

Mikko Kuoppa asserted that active engagement in the workplaces is now necessary as concerns unemployment age limits. Reijo Kalmakurki emphasized that a many-sided and concrete approach is essential in the so-called new way of thinking. He warned against their repeating the mistakes made in the 1960's in appraising the new phase. Urho Jokinen said that conceiving of the new way of thinking as a fashionable affair would make it lose its persuasiveness unless it acquires content and unless it is concrete.

Leena Sokero reported that 1,200 people had participated in the DEVA member vote in Lapland. She also stressed the importance of a broadly based movement of the unemployed. Erkki Susi asserted that it was essential for them in their election campaign to be able to state the various important election issues as clearly and concisely as possible.

Tapani Saarimäki felt that the Central Committee did the right thing in taking a stand on agricultural policy. He cited several examples of practices in the importation of products that make trade with the Soviets more difficult. Tapio Furuholm stressed the primary importance of the election campaign and its importance in strengthening the party organization. He also said that no demonstrations are too big since the jobs of 4,000 people are at stake, like at Wartsila-Valmet.

Merja Halme emphasized how serious the situation that has arisen because of the expulsions in the Women's League is for the progress of the women's effort. Kaisa Salminen asked whether they could find the courage to present major demands. Of these, he among others cited lowering of the general retirement age and shortening of the work week.

Pirkko Turpeinen remarked that election campaign slogans must not be exclusive and pointed out the very low voter turnout in some residential areas. She said that the fact that Finnish agricultural products are pure has been forgotten in connection with the discussion on food products.

Markus Puranen reported on the election campaign in Etela-Hame where they are particularly far-advanced in their planning. Erkki Lehtinen reported on the multigenerational phases of the nomination of candidates in Keski-Suomi and on their experiences in collecting [names in support of] a "People's Interpellation Paper."

Seppo Kortelainen warned against setting organization work and the election campaign against one another; they must be capable of combining them. Heikki Pusa said that it was important for them to concentrate their efforts on the main issues, but, like Kortelainen, he stressed the importance of organization work in the election campaign. Antti Hanninen criticized the fact that the discussion of the election is still too much of a "general discussion"; it should now be put into action. Jouko Kajanoja said that the establishment of contacts with the masses is progressing well, and presented some new points of view to improve the election campaign.

#### Women's League

On the second day of the Central Committee session Mirja Ruikka reported on the situation in the Finnish Democratic Women's League. After animated discussion the Central Committee endorsed its position on the matter (published elsewhere in our newspaper).

Reijo Kalmakurki reported on tasks of current importance in connection with their educational and cultural efforts, on which they also engaged in fairly extensive discussion.

#### Congress

Jouko Kajanoja presented the tasks to be accomplished in preparing for the 21st SKP (unity) Congress.

In accordance with the Central Committee resolution, in preparing for the congress they will aim for three position papers: a political accounting, a platform and party paper and a political paper.

The Political Committee and the Platform Committee will be assigned the task of making preparations. The preparation relating to the grounds for revising the rules will be coupled with the drafting of a revised platform.

Candidates for the congress will be nominated in the party cells from 1 March to 5 April. Member votes will be held by districts from 13 April to 4 May.

A big celebration will be organized on 7 June 1987 in connection with the congress.

#### TIEDONANTAJA's Efforts

Kari Seppanen reported on the efforts to improve TIEDONANTAJA circulation. To increase the paper's circulation next year as well, it will have to be kept in an especially key position in connection with the party effort. The Central Committee entered into a discussion on improvement of the newspaper and efforts to increase circulation in which different forms of newspaper work were

discussed. It was emphasized that improvement of the paper and the organizations must go hand in hand.

The Central Committee endorsed a position on the efforts to improve TIEDONANTAJA which will be published in its entirety in the Wednesday edition of the paper. In its position paper TIEDONANTAJA is specified as the chief instrument of the preparations for the elections and the 21st Congress.

#### DEVA Described

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 14 Nov 86 p 8

[Article by Risto Repo: "DEVA Does Not Fit into Any Mold"]

[Text] The maverick of Finland's political life, the DEVA, has now been in existence for about a half a year. That is a short time for a political organization. But in a small country like Finland we also find new phenomena in the political arena categorized by the press, if not otherwise, into neat packages which people believe with their names tell them "everything" that there is to be known about them.

They have tried to fit the DEVA into a mold too. Sometimes it is a "Stalinist election organization," sometimes a "minority Communist party" or a "new Communist party."

One can after all always give something a name. What is odd about this business is chiefly the fact that among those interested in the DEVA the new organization is perceived from an entirely different viewpoint. It simply does not fit into the framework of an "SKP dispute," nor is it felt to be merely an election organization either.

It is regarded more as representing something that has long been lacking in Finnish political life. Something that is just taking shape and that therefore offers broader opportunities for action than the other political parties. The DEVA does not fit into any mold because it is incomplete. It is, to boot, in terms of organizational structure still so loose that it will scarcely ever-- fortunately -- be "completed."

#### Unsuited

There is a great deal in the DEVA that "does not suit anyone." When the organization was founded last spring, they had to collect 5,000 signatures to register it. The name-collecting was done in a half-indifferent manner along with other organizational chores. The result: The 27,000 signatures took even the collectors by surprise. So a considerably large number of those who signed were people who did not politically identify themselves with the SKP, to say nothing of with some "faction."

Rallies organized in different parts of Finland on behalf of the DEVA have strengthened this impression. Those who have stayed out of organizational activities because of the "SKP dispute" as well as entirely new people have participated in them.

The DEVA does not give rise to the same sort of political prejudices as the name, SKP, or even this newspaper does.

People have contacted "DEVA-ites," asked them for advice on how to deal with some local issue even when the organization itself is not needed to handle it.

In one place they even considered participating in the parish elections on behalf of the DEVA.

The nomination of candidates for the parliamentary elections also indicated that the DEVA is developing into something that does not really fit into any mold. In Turku, where what is usually one of the strongest SKP district organizations operates, the DEVA ticket is politically the most broadly based. Fully six of the 17 candidates are other than Communists or People's Democrats. In addition to the five independents, one of the country's best-known representatives of the Greens movement is a candidate. Independents, "overt Greens" and Socialist Workers Party candidates are also on DEVA tickets elsewhere in the country.

#### New Kind of Democracy

The DEVA's distinctive character is not limited to the fact that it goes beyond the usual political boundary fences and prejudices in nominating candidates and in terms of its supporters.

Ordinarily, political movements substantially assume the casts of "their leaders" and the issue of leadership and the composition of the governing bodies plays a very important role in their internal lives. In the DEVA the center of gravity is on the basic level, and perhaps that is why the leadership problem is not considered to be of particular importance — at least not so far.

The following story will perhaps illustrate this point. I called three DEVA district secretaries and described to them a "case" in which someone wanted to "serve in some organization"; he did not want to join the SKP, nor serve within the framework of its organizations. Each time the conversation followed the same line:

"How did I hear about the DEVA?"

"Almost every week something is organized on behalf of the DEVA concerning the Soviet trade, alternative budgets, unemployment, housing, the day-care issue...."

"Can I join a DEVA cell?"

"There are SKP cells, youth cells and SKDL cells that are DEVA cells."

"I don't want to join any of your contentious organizations. Doesn't the DEVA have any of its own?"

"We ourselves didn't want to create new organizations, overorganize the DEVA."



"Can I form a DEVA cell with Matti, Lasse, Liisa and Leena to, for example, resolve the day-care problem in our residential area?"

"Certainly, that's exactly how it should work."

"Can we send a delegate to the DEVA conference?"

"Of course, the whole bunch of you can come."

#### Certainly a Start

They have also made an effort to apply the new type of democracy to the way DEVA position papers are dealt with. The organization's election proclamation was submitted "to the people for discussion" as early as last spring, the DEVA budget was drafted jointly with democratic mass organizations and civic movements and it too is now "being discussed by the people" and they are right now collecting [signatures for] a "People's Interpellation Paper" on the Soviet trade and unemployment.

Some may view the frequent use of the word "people" as grandiloquence, especially since the party cannot yet boast of enormous support figures. The fact is, however, that not a single political organization has striven for as broad a democracy internally and in its relations with potential supporters as what the DEVA is aiming for.

There are historical reasons for this. Those originally from the SKP and the SKDL who were kicked out of them for political reasons founded the DEVA. They who have suffered all the consequences of an undemocratic situation did not want to have to experience the same thing a second time.

Very many of them say too that DEVA activities are marked by a long yearned-for "freedom." This has made even conventional organization people direct their efforts "outward." They have attended and appeared at fairs, in marketplaces, at alternative markets, leased DEVA buses, published their own newspapers and leaflets.

It would be an exaggeration to talk of a big breakout yet. But the shackles of a lack of courage have already been radically cast off even in this short period of time. As a DEVA activist imitating a television commercial said: "The limits of one's possibilities are set chiefly by one's own imagination."

#### Social Contract

The other political forces have primarily assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward the DEVA. They are waiting for the results of the March elections. as far as the coming elections and all the parties are concerned, the Gallup polls have been fluctuating to a considerable degree and, while support for the DEVA has been steadily increasing, gauging the outcome is particularly difficult due to the youth of the organization. Behind the scenes they are saying that its chances are good, but in the next local elections perhaps rather than in the parliamentary elections.

The history of its birth also makes it difficult to judge the fate of the DEVA: It is regarded as being only a consequence of the SKP situation.

In reality at least three factors evolved roughly at the same time but for in part different reasons: the SKP dissolution process, the need for moving from the old political encumbrances to a new kind of free, democratic political party and the final collapse of SKDL authority as such ending in the expulsions. Of these, especially the second factor mentioned is so powerful that they would have had to create a party like the DEVA even if they had been able to settle the disputes between the SKP and the SKDL favorably. In that event their situations at the outset would only have been far easier. In the future we must actively strive for such an increase in strength.

#### Turku Conference

So the DEVA is just taking shape as a political party. A lack of audacity is still in the minds of many slowing down its development. Some have voiced doubts as to whether the DEVA is pulling the rug out from under the activities of the Communists. Its roots would indeed be weak if that happened.

On Independence Day, 6-7 December, 1,000 DEVA delegates and activists are expected to arrive in Turku to finally decide on the organization's election platform and on the DEVA budget, which has received a great deal of praise. The delegates will actually be sent directly by the party cells, which fact will also add to the democratic character of the conference. Under the pretext of this conference a mobile rally will also elect the leaders of the DEVA.

We can perhaps expect this to be one of the most interesting political conferences that has been organized in this country in years. Since you never know what may happen with the DEVA.

#### SDNL Direction, Independence

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 18 Nov 86 p 20

[Article by Lena Bjorklund: "What's Going on in the Women's League?"]

[Text] 1. People's Democratic Family: Get Smaller Together?

The "Aalto" SKP's determination in connection with the dissolution of the People's Democratic organizations is great. With dissolution advancing from the SKP to the Youth League and the Women's League, that image of the People's Democratic "family" which was inculcated into us Pioneers in the 1970's when I was serving as a Pioneer guide comes to mind more and more often.

We told them about the People's Democratic movement. We felt that it was absolutely necessary for the children to get to know the People's Democratic organizations, although their connection with the everyday lives of the children was often quite minimal. I myself thought of telling the children about our organized comrades in the struggle. Along the lines of: Together there are more of us.

With the dissolution of the organizations the People's Democratic family's inner-directed heat has revealed its presence more and more clearly. I don't know whether the People's Democratic family has always had this negative trait, but this inner-directed heat has always raised its head in difficult

situations. I ran into it when the SKP was split and I see too that it has been one of the major causes of factionalism.

The way I portrayed the People's Democratic family to the Pioneers at that time was a description of an internal democratic front. Now led by Aalto, the SKP is cutting this interior core into ever smaller pieces. The most recent example was at the 14th Women's League Convention, at which the representatives of six women's districts were not elected to the Executive Committee at all.

## 2. "A New Direction for the Women's League?"

The convention has been described in the People's Democratic press as a positive event that marks a new era. In connection with the effort in Satakunta, Outi Ojala, the new chairwoman of the Women's League, said that the League's chief objectives have for a long time now been finding a solution to the low wage problem and shortening the work week.

"To carry out these objectives, according to Outi Ojala, the SDNL should try to unite the different factions of the trade union movement and the political spectrum," the newspaper said.

On the one hand, they are preparing to unite and, on the other, to separate. It brings to mind a crazy quilt.

Outi Ojala did not find the convention elevating. She admitted that force was employed at the convention, but she felt that it was unavoidable.

KANSAN AANI speaks of the districts of Etela-Saimaa, Helsinki, Joensuu, Lahti, Pohjois-Hame and Uusimaa "as supporters of Sinisalo and Kajanoja." The newspaper said that the Women's League has now defined its position. How? This way:

No representatives were elected to the Executive Committee from the six districts. According to the rules, the League Council was obliged to elect them. The proposals made by the six districts, which dealt with the kind of "everyday life" women desire in the most specific way, were totally ignored.

Former Women's League chairwoman Inger Hirvela has written "On Democracy and Morality" in KANSAN UUTISET. There is such a Jesuit morality in the article that she can justify any act whatsoever:

"In my opinion, those who have jeopardized the common action and therefore excluded themselves from it certainly cannot be granted the same rights as others. It would be most unfair to the others. At that point democratic rights are solely the right to be heard and the right to defend oneself. If the defense is unsatisfactory, the partners in cooperation have the moral right to permanently exclude the troublemakers from their activities."

May the Lord protect us underpaid women from being dragged along with this sense of justice!

## 3. Independence or a Role in the SKDL?

The newspapers have conspicuously played up the connection between the Women's League and the SKDL. Why?

The six districts, these "supporters of Sinisalo and Kajanoja," have proposed as a basis for league activities greater independence with a certain detachment from one's membership in the organization in mind.

An independent person whose mind is outer-directed operates with objective premises. We need self-determined action on the part of women in breaking loose from their position in today's society. The People's Democratic newspapers do not understand this, speaking instead of the "supporters of Sinisalo and Kajanoja's" vague premises, their desire to be a "cover organization" and their desire to operate with "extinguished lamps."

A choice of policy line that is in keeping with the dissolution of the party was made at the League convention convoked as a new direction. An independent Women's League would have had a quite different option: united action in accordance with the demands of the times. It could have walked elsewhere than in the footsteps of Vainionpaa and Aalto. Marja-Liisa Loyttyjarvi indicated this at the convention:

"Despite the many pretty quotations from poems, the convention was a brutal, majority-rule convention. Many comrades who used to assert that the women operate more democratically, more openly and more tolerantly raised their hands in favor of discrimination and the stifling of criticism and deliberation.

"Many comrades who have asserted that they were working for Women's League independence knuckled under to pressure from the outside and placed implementation of a divided election of SKDL leaders and loyalty to the SKDL above their obligations as members of the Women's League and voted for a change in the nature of the democratic SDNL mass organizations."

Inger Hirvela does not concede that force was employed in connection with the discrimination, but there were "difficulties." The fellows in the SKP have had these difficulties too:

"As I was writing this, the thought entered my mind: Did Esko ever hug Arvo when the situation in the party was at its most difficult point?"

#### 4. What Will Happen Now?

The convention issues were important and proper at the headline level. The responses and the procedural methods that were chosen were wrong. At the time they said that the goal was now the course of action. That the political results were in accordance with the procedures employed. Now the end justifies the means and the words.

The newly elected League Executive Committee announced that it will expel the Etela-Saimaa, Helsinki, Joensuu, Lahti, Pohjois-Hame and Uusimaa district organizations from membership in the SDNL next Saturday, 22 November.

The convention also set a model for district meetings. Only "their own" will be accepted on the district committees and proposals submitted at meetings will be dealt with in any way at all. Kaija Sinerva from Turku said that district

chairwoman Anna-Liisa Jokinen smudged the "People's Interpellation Paper" by drawing her big suspenders across both sides of the paper and finally crumpled the whole paper at the Turku Women's District annual meeting held last weekend.

The Uusimaa Women's District in an open letter appealed to all Women's League members to prevent the League from being destroyed:

"Defend SDNL independence and women's movement independence. Don't let the tradition of the working women's movement and our League be broken."

What do women's movement independence and SDNL tradition mean? The rallying of our forces is at issue. The nation's wave of conservatism has raised the women's issue in an entirely new way and the women's movements are going through an entirely new phase. The times demand a Women's League that moves ordinary women to act on behalf of their rights.

A League that is implemented as an election organization and for politics, whose policies are determined elsewhere than in the Women's League is incapable of fulfilling its mission at the present time. And this no matter how much we hug one another and even if we were to achieve a more solid People's Democratic nuclear family and a safe atmosphere of kindred souls by expelling people.

11,466

CSO: 3617/37

## 'UNDERGROUND CURRENTS' NOTED IN RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

Athens KYRIAKATI KI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Dec 86 p 9

[Article by Kyra Adam]

[Text] Many questions are accumulating lately with regard to the stagnation of Greek-Turkish relations. Of course the government insists that there can be no Greek-Turkish dialogue unless conditions posed by the Greek side are fulfilled:

--Withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus.

--Recognition of the status quo in the Aegean.

Nevertheless, one can note certain "subterranean currents and moves" lately, which, unless they take place in a state of naivete, point to some kind of dialogue with Turkey.

The strange thing is that such moves and indications are noted, not without surprise and reservations, by diplomatic circles which cannot make up their minds whether they come from "spontaneous" or "autonomous" actions of other forces, or whether they signify a "change of course" in Greek-Turkish relations about which they do not yet know.

What is certain, however, is that--for the present--the behind-the-scenes pressures on Greece to start some kind of a dialogue with Turkey continue to be strong.

Although Washington takes care, in its official contacts with Athens, not to raise the issue of Greek-Turkish relations since NATO has a primary role in the issue, behind the scenes does not faithfully follow this tactic.

Thus, according to reports, as an aside to an older and informal contact, before Irangate, Secretary of State George Shultz discreetly but steadily pressed his Greek counterpart to open a dialogue with Turkey. In fact, to open a spectacular dialogue as soon as possible, with the initiative taken by Athens! And this took place only minutes after the Greek foreign minister had just completed a detailed analysis of Greek-Turkish relations and of the dangers Greece faces from Turkey.

Of course, Ankara has not missed a single opportunity to push in its propaganda for a "dialogue." In this way it serves its interests best, knowing that Greece will remain steadfast in its view that all necessary conditions for her national security and national sovereignty must be satisfied before any official effort to restore relations with Turkey can begin. Nevertheless, Ankara never stops to propose a "dialogue" on the basis of "common interests" on particular "technical" issues which, however, could easily push the two sides to a dialogue on all issues.

An illustration of this kind is the effort of the Turkish representative to ICAO, who approximately 2 months ago tried to raise the issue of air corridors over the Aegean by forming a bilateral ICAO regional committee in exchange for certain concessions by Greece on the question of Turkey's admission to EEC.

Current conditions, especially after the American-Iranian scandal which affects the entire Middle East region, favor the indirect but clear tactic by Ankara to initiate an informal dialogue with Athens on specific, secondary issues, a fact which will pave the way for a future, full dialogue. In such a climate, meetings of Greek and Turkish specialists on given issues such as anti-terrorist cooperation in the Mediterranean, or cooperation in exploration projects in the same area, seem to leave the leadership of the Foreign Ministry indifferent. Strangely, when one seeks some explanation, both the Foreign Ministry and the government spokesman remain silent, without denying or affirming events and incidents.

This stand gives rise to many questions as to whether--informally but steadily--an effort, step by step, has started to resolve some Greek-Turkish disputes. If something of the sort is indeed underway, the next question is if and to what extent has Athens worked out specific positions or has it left the matter to the discretion and initiative of those who would like to take over this extremely difficult task?

There are many more questions, most of them quite obvious. What is not clear is why the officials continue to remain silent every time one mentions to them a specific event.

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CSO: 3521/53

## PASOK ERRORS IN POLICY, METHODOLOGY STRESSED

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Dec 86 p 8

[Article by Giorgis Massavetas]

[Text] It is indeed admirable how fearful the parties are of the prospect that intra-party democracy may reach the point that there will be some factions within them. In other words, the possibility of some who will have a different view from that of those who control the party machinery.

The fear is exactly the same whether we have all-powerful PASOK or the hardly alive EDA. In fact, the latter refuses to see it has been broken into two and that unless the two parts operate as factions cooperating and complementing each other, the end will be a final divorce.

But, after all, EDA is, according to prevailing terminology, a part of the "traditional" Left. But what happens with the "new Left," as PASOK likes to portray itself, or as the leftists who put their hopes on it, believed it was?

Here we are faced not only with the fears of its leaders, but we have to deal with its inconsistency because the leadership made other promises to the fighters of the Left when the Panhellenic Liberation Movement [PAK] and the Democratic Defense joined forces to form the Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK].

They promised precisely that there was going to be a political party which would be distinguished by the existence and functioning of factions. There was even a provision that each faction would publish its own weekly.

Since then, of course, many things have changed in PASOK so that this inconsistency appears unimportant. Yet, everything started from that--from the fact that the theory of "homogeneity" became the party's prevailing "ideology". That is, to think the same, to act the same, to talk the same, and above all to say the same things--and woe to those who dared to be different.

In the last session of the Central Committee there was again much talk about mistakes. This is how it was done in KKE, where as a rule all decisions



were unanimous only to agree later, again unanimously, that the decisions were wrong. Usually the same people admitted the mistakes, except that in the meantime some were used as scapegoats.

Is this the first time in the case of PASOK that we hear about mistakes? Not at all. The dominant group around the PASOK chairman rejected at its Congress the proposal to dissolve the branch committees of the party. Yet the same group dissolved them unobtrusively two years later--using methods which were not distinguished by their democratic character.

The same group indignantly rejected the proposal for a political cadres school--taking to task at that time Paraskevas Avgerinos. Two years after the Congress the same group now proposes that a special committee of the Central Committee deal with it.

One could mention dozens of such illustrations because there are indeed many contradictions between the PASOK Congress and its current orientations. Of course, these contradictions do not refer to the Central Committee whose members merely vote, almost unanimously, for fear that they may be accused of factionalism. They refer to the top leadership of the party.

This talk of mistakes goes on and on. Nothing is more natural than to commit new mistakes all the time, whether one speaks of political options or the choice of individuals, as long as our parties insist on following the syndrome of Ulysses.

Under this syndrome the skipper of the ship is the only one entitled to have his ears unplugged and hear the Sirens, while all those who wield the oars to keep the vessel moving must have their ears sealed with wax.

The only difference is that the Ulysseses of today have taken one further step that even the ancient Ulysses who reached Ithaca alone did not think to apply. They do not even hesitate to gag even the Sirens themselves. At least he was curious enough to hear their song.

There is also a comic aspect to this: The "new leftists" resort to the same tactics that destroyed the traditional Left, precisely at the very moment some hint of a spring appears where the glacier of Stalinism once stood, precisely at the moment Gorbachev allows TASS to broadcast unpleasant news from Alma Ata. But in defiance of every protracted winter, spring eventually arrives. It will inevitably arrive.

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CSO: 3521/53

## NEW POLICY OF ASSENT SEEN NEEDED FOR PASOK

## Self Reliance Said Inadequate

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Dec 86 p 9

[Text] As we enter the new year the country's political life follows a "blind" course. The policies and intentions of the parties is marked by total uncertainty. The government is in conflict with the block of social forces which with such zest brought it to power in October 1981. The "social peace" is broken and the working people are constantly protesting. On national questions there is no responsible information and the false rumors are rampant. No one trusts anyone.

Andreas Papandreou, speaking as PASOK chairman at the 20th session of the Central Committee, did not meet the expectations of his followers. And in his capacity as premier he did not quiet the people's worries on the course the country is following. He left everything at a dead point of waiting and stagnant immobility. It seems that the country is governed only by the force of inertia.

The New Democracy major opposition party appears to have accepted the necessity of letting PASOK stay in power while the economic crisis goes on, as long as the open issues in Greek-American and Greek-NATO relations remain unsettled. In any event, ND does not seem to be able to present a convincing alternative to the government's present policies.

The communist Left moves on suitable ground of demands by the working people, trying to regain its lost influence, and thus stays out of the power game. The communist strategy to reassemble the leftist front of Change [PASOK] does not have any prospects of bringing the party to governmental power. Andreas Papandreou categorically stated at the Central Committee session that he is not going to abandon the strategy of parliamentary self-sufficiency [Note: No coalition government with other parties]. This was the only precise point stated in this fruitless session of the Committee.

It is evident that both the government and leaders of the parties are unable to act energetically to get the country out of the impasse. No party undertakes any political initiatives to open the way to new developments. Of course, this is not due to the incompetence of the parties or to the complexity of the problems. To bring the economy out of the crisis and to

stabilize the country's international relations, today requires actions which carry a political cost. And all parties try to avoid such cost as they vie for governmental power.

The country's problems today require consensual solutions supported by all parties. Setting aside the initial or more recent causes for these problems, the fact remains that their solution requires that all parties assume responsibility.

Here we have the responsibility of the government, which is under the impression that because it has a parliamentary majority it can act as it pleases. It faces with hostility and usually in a provocative manner the major opposition party, while it needs its support considering it represents more than 40% of the electorate. It ignores and usually faces with contempt the communist Left although it knows how much influence it has in the labor unions.

The PASOK leadership has confused its self sufficiency in parliamentary votes with omnipotence in government. It has confused political self sufficiency with political truculence. It has also confused political balances with deliberate confusion, uncertainty and demagogic deceit. So, it managed, by its own actions, to have the economic stabilization measures and normalization of our relations with the USA and NATO attacked, often blindly, by all opposition parties.

The PASOK government has not understood that economic stabilization measures cannot succeed as long as the working people respond to these measures with strikes. And, of course, for the consent of the workers, the best collaborator was not the PASOK-controlled General Federation of Greek Labor [GSEE]. The government ignored both the communist Left and ND, and now it tries to defend itself behind the obsolete political slogan of the "unholy alliance."

Not only the economic measures but also steps for normalization of our relations with the USA and NATO will remain in a state of harmful uncertainty as long as ND waits for the moment to attack PASOK on the issue of national independence while the communist Left waits to benefit from anti-imperialist displeasure. On this issue, too, the government is in danger of facing... unholy alliances because it does not have the courage to reveal with sincerity its intentions to the other parties.

The premier's argument that if the government makes known its intentions it will lose a negotiating trump card is groundless. To most the potent negotiating trump card is the common position of the parties. The decision whether the bases will stay or go is a political decision and should be taken before any negotiations start.

If the government's decision is to allow the bases to stay, it should invite the parties, explain how it reached this decision, and then work out with them terms for their stay. Armed then with the consensus of the parties, it could start negotiations with the U.S. to impose its terms.

On the other hand, if it has decided that the bases should leave, it has an added reason to inform the parties and explain the reasons so together they can face any American countermoves. There will be parties which will disagree with the first or second decision, but in both cases the government will be able to deal with the problem with a wider consensus.

Otherwise, by hiding its intentions and its unclear policies it draws the fire of all opposition parties--the opposition of ND, which would have supported a decision to keep the bases, and the opposition of the communist Left, which would have supported a decision to terminate them. Worse, it allows Robert Killey, the American ambassador, to play the game of "consensual processes" for the retention of the bases, within the Greek political domain.

The stabilization of the economy and Greek-American and Greek-NATO relations exceeds the possibilities of a single-party policy even by a government which has parliamentary self sufficiency. Government policy on this problem has reached an impasse because it refuses to seek consensual processes. It rejects them because it is afraid of provoking turbulence inside PASOK. This fear does not allow it to seek the consensus or at least the tolerance on these two national issues of those political forces whose views resemble a specific governmental policy.

The PASOK leadership is reluctant to take any initiative at the national level to deal with these two specific issues of national significance because it does not want to cause doubt in the minds of its followers about the purity of its socialist visions. It will be unable to escape the impasse as long as it continues to classify political alliances and cooperative moves as unholy and blessed.

Only if the PASOK leadership begins to understand the messages of our time will it be able to open the way for positive political developments and retain the initiative. If it surrenders to its "phobias", it will dissipate in the impasses created by its policies.

#### Reconciliation With Karamanlis Predicted

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 Dec 86 p 9

[Article by Spyros Karatzaferis]

[Excerpt] There is one type of information the journalist can prove to be valid, in which case he can report it since he is able to counter any possible--and in Greece rather certain--denial by the authorities. Then, there are other forms of information equally valid that he cannot prove because its sources put limits as to how far he can go.

If the information is important and signals developments which are of interest to the nation, the journalist is transformed into an acrobat. He searches for the suitable path to pass on to the public information without the danger

of denial, without "burning" his access to his sources, and without betraying his profession.

The path I chose in this case is that of "prophecy" which can be refuted only by time. The prophecy, which is based on information and logical analysis, says: Within the year 1987 relations between Premier A. Papandreou and former President of the Republic K. Karamanlis will be restored, with the highest point reached at a personal meeting.

The process for restoring relations of the two men--which were severed on March 9, 1985 when Papandreu suddenly decided to nominate Kh. Sartzetakis for president instead of Karamanlis--have been going on for some time, in spite of what is said behind the scenes and in spite of any statements to the contrary.

The premier appears to be open to some possible initiative "to remove the misunderstanding with Karamanlis," and from the very day Sartzetakis was elected president Papandreu tried to keep the road to Karamanlis open.

With openness and political courage Papandreu praised the Karamanlis presidency, avoided anything that might insult the former president, and recently it came out that Papandreu said somewhere that his "biggest mistake was that he removed Karamanlis from the presidency." No one knows for sure if Papandreu said anything of the sort, but no one has come out to convincingly deny it.

On the other hand, Karamanlis remains bitter about Papandreu's tactics on the president's election and considers the government responsible for the "fouls" committed by Sartzetakis' presidency against Karamanlis.

In brief, this is the situation in relations between the two political leaders, but the needs of the country and wishes of "third parties" dictate something else, namely, that any bitterness (possibly justified) and any complaints should be set aside and that the two most powerful political leaders in the country restore their relations and their contacts.

It is generally agreed, both here and abroad, that in order to overcome our problems--economic and national (Greek-Turkish relations, the bases, the Cypriot problem) we need a domestic consensus. It is also agreed that, beyond petty politics and the egotism of leaders, this political consensus cannot be achieved unless the founder of the ND party gives his blessing. If Karamanlis agrees, Mitsotakis cannot withhold his consent.

A. Papandreu, an experienced politician, knows that the consensus he so much needs to solve problems passes through Karamanlis. Karamanlis also knows equally well that the problems and expected solutions not only brought him back into the political game but have given him a few extra aces.

The good thing is that both Karamanlis and Papandreou are responsible political leaders and one can speculate that they have the strength to set aside their personal differences for the sake of the national interest.

Papandreou faces a difficult trip to the U.S. and a decisive meeting with President Reagan. During the meeting solutions for our national and economic problems will be set in motion. But to set in motion such solutions, Papandreou must reach a "meeting of the minds" with the American president, at least on the questions of the bases, the Voice of America, and recognition of Israel.

Such an "understanding" needs the support of Karamanlis who, as I hear, tells those personalities he invites to his home for a cup of coffee or for dinner, or to a Sunday outing to a restaurant in the countryside, that "Andreas will give everything to the Americans because he cannot do otherwise."

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CSO: 3521/53

## CURRENTS WITHIN PASOK SAID TO EXPRESS DIFFERENT VIEWS

Athens KYRIAKATI KI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 21 Dec 86 p 11

[Text] As soon as possible, probably within the week, some of the nine special PASOK committees will meet. This was decided last weekend by the Central Committee. Already the Executive Bureau in two successive meetings appointed committee members on the basis of recommendations by members of the Central Committee.

Of the nine committees, the one to be activated as soon as possible to complete its task before the next meeting of the Central Committee in February is the committee assigned preparation of the proposal for the party's manifesto. Membership of the committee includes, according to reports, G. Gennimatas, Mika Koutsilaïou, Vaso Papandreou, George Papandreou, and S. Kostopoulos.

But while the Central Committee members are active, based on what was decided by its session, things within PASOK in the face of new options and focusing on old positions remain uncertain.

From the Right

Thus, in the recent session of the Central Committee, two "tendencies" appeared on the subject of what content should be given to the effort for "renewal of PASOK." One tendency (faction) holds that if the governing party wants to remain in power and avert other possible "electoral surprises" such as those of the municipal elections, it must sharpen and modernize its initial positions in such a way as to attract followers and voters from the Right.

Those who espouse this view hold that PASOK cannot expect to attract any more voters from the Left since both international conditions and the domestic situation with economic difficulties do not allow more leftist positions and declarations than those of 1981, for example.

On the contrary, a renewed PASOK, according to those who support this view, must prove it can manage this crisis in the best way without other "leaps to the Left." In other words, PASOK must acquire a social-democratic character, while at the same time increase its governmental efficiency.

According to reports, among those supporting this view are highly placed officials such as Giannis Alevras [president of the Vouli] and Menios Koutsogiorgas [Minister of Interior] as well as cadres who belong to the premier's inner circle.

#### To the Left

The second faction within the Central Committee appears to be that PASOK's renewal can be assured primarily with an opening to the Left--attracting leftist voters--since the newly elaborated and specified positions of PASOK will stress many of its Marxist elements.

The advocates of this view, who include members of the previous Executive Bureau, argue that PASOK must now begin to seriously think about the future application of the simple representation electoral system.

The "noble competition" between the advocates of the two opposing views on PASOK's future course will be intensified during the next meeting of the Central committee in February, which many believe will be critical.

#### The Prevailing View

It appears that the first view has a little more support than the other and if we are to believe some government officials, the not "spectacular return" of Kostas Laliotis to the Movement is up to a point due to certain negative suggestions made to the premier who took them into account. This may explain why Laliotis was not reactivated, although this was regarded as a certainty following the exchange of letters between him and Papandreou. Such a reactivation did not take place, possibly at the suggestion of Giannis Alevras.

In any event, one may expect "spectacular" changes in the membership of the Executive Bureau during the next meeting of the Central committee.

#### Only Akis [Tsokhatzopoulos]

The forecasts so far indicate that only Akis Tsokhatzopoulos will retain his post as liaison between the party and the government. The remaining prospective members of the Executive Bureau will have to choose between their government and party posts, according to the decision of Premier Papandreou, which must be regarded as final and irrevocable.

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CSO: 3521/53



## TSOKHATZOPOULOS' INFLUENCE SEEN WANING

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 23 Dec 86 pp 1-2

[Text] Lately, the star of Mr. Akis Tsokhatzopoulos, minister to the premier, is on a descending course because he has been weakened, both within the party (proof is his totally marginal role as a member of the Executive Bureau) at the recent meeting of PASOK's Central Committee and within the government.

The premier has decided to remove Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos from the executive bureau next February and to cut him off from any intraparty support he may have. On the other hand, ever since last year Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos, after his detachment from the so-called "historical troika" of the executive bureau (Laliotis, Gennimatas), and his hard intraparty machinations (expulsion of labor unionists, local cadres, selection of mayoral candidates, etc.) has experienced a considerable decrease in his influence within the party. At the same time, Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos' strength as a "pipeline" to Mr. Andreas Papandreou has been extremely curtailed mainly by two facts.

First, because a number of party cadres of the so-called "German group" found themselves enmeshed in scandals and "scandal allegations" (Papamandelos, Papathanasopoulos, Karakhalios, Soulis Apostolopoulos, etc.) as individuals favored by Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos, much as Dim. Sotirlis and Nik. Makropoulos had found themselves earlier.

Second, because Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos has provoked the anger of certain businessmen, large contractors and publishers by the undisguised--as was reported to Mr. Andreas Papandreou himself--use of his office to favor a certain large contractor who has business interests in the publishing business. As a matter of fact, some big businessmen in public works construction assert that they have incontrovertible evidence of Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos' abuse of office.

This abuse of office by Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos is connected, by the premier's entourage, to the known abuses of office of the minister to the premier, both in the Salonica Nome (where nepotism and favoritism by Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos are considered to be the main reason for the local losses suffered by PASOK) and in the advisory committees of the party's machinery.

This accumulation of allegations appears to have snowballed lately against Mr. Tsokhatzopoulos who is undergoing--according to reliable sources--a deep insecurity crisis.

POLITICAL

GREECE

PAPER REPORTS ON 'ANTI-WESTERN CLIMATE' IN MEDIA

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 10 Dec 85 p 10

[Text] At present the permanent machinery to foment an anti-Western climate through the mass communications media controlled by the government is on the upswing. The opportunities that are being exploited (Iran-gate, student-disturbances in France) actually lend themselves to magnifying anti-American and anti-Western sentiment as a whole. This is particularly true when they appeal to a public that has become inured to this kind of bias and does not react when, for instance, for almost a month it has seen the "arms sales to Iran" affair occupy first place on ERT's foreign newscast.

It does not appear that journalistic ethics and other related "abstract" matters overly bother the reporters who edit the newscasts. An example from ERT's channel 2 newscast of 7 December (Sunday noon) is characteristic. In it, in the Middle Eastern news, top priority was given to the wounding of two Palestinians by Israelis during protests in the Gaza Strip and then the murder of seven Palestinians (four of them women) by the Shiite Amal in Lebanon. This and many more "small" cases belie the image that is projected according to which only government intervention is to blame for the situation regarding the newscasts. It appears that the reporters who edit them bear not only part of the responsibility, but also that of the related initiatives .

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CSO: 3521/40

## MINISTER: GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO INCREASE AFGHANISTAN AID

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 86 p 12

[Article by Kaa Eneberg; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The government is prepared to increase Swedish aid to the destitute people of Afghanistan in the next budget year. The aid will go to the people in the occupied country who have been subject to terror bombing attacks and to the millions living in camps in Pakistan.

On Wednesday the Swedish Afghanistan Committee, headed by Liberal Riksdag member Karin Ahrlund, met with Foreign Aid Minister Lena Hjelm-Wallen to discuss the work of the volunteer organization. The minister mentioned the prospect of increasing aid to 20 million kronor in the next budget year. This year the committee received 15 million.

The committee, which has been operating for 4 years, has collected several million kronor on its own. The money goes primarily for food assistance and medicine for the people in Afghanistan or in the camp in Peshar, where a million refugees are living.

The meeting was attended by journalist Anders Fange who described the controls used to make sure the money really reaches suffering people out in the isolated mountain regions. The controls will be further tightened by hiring Afghans to help the committee with its activities.

#### Sharp Increase

He also told of the sharp increase in refugees that has occurred in the last half year at the time when new government leader Mikhail Gorbachev expressed a desire to solve the problem.

"Earlier we could expect a flow of 5,000 refugees a month. But now it is up to 30-40,000. Whole rural districts have evacuated after hearing reports of massacres and terror bombing attacks," he said after the meeting.

On 27 December the Afghanistan Committee will start a campaign lasting into March to collect signatures protesting the terror bombing attacks that do not seem to be getting much attention, especially on the international level. The drive will start with a big rally in Malmo where Undersecretary Pierre Schori and others will talk about the war in Afghanistan.

## POLL SHOWS MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD USSR

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Dec 86 p 18

[Text] The attitude of Swedes toward the United States and the Soviet Union has changed in the last 2 years. Their view of the Soviet Union has become more positive, while their view of the United States has gone in the other direction.

This is apparent from an opinion poll conducted by the Swedish Institute for Public Opinion Polls [SIFO] for the Psychological Defense Board (SPF). In all 1,021 people between the ages of 16 and 74 were interviewed in September and October.

More than one in four (28 percent) of those polled felt the United States is a threat to Sweden or has an unfriendly attitude. Two years ago only 17 percent gave that response.

This year 65 percent felt the United States is friendly or that there is no enmity between Sweden and the United States, In 1984, 80 percent felt that way.

## Good Country

Two years ago 80 percent felt the Soviet Union was unfriendly or represented a threat to Sweden. This year the figure had declined to 72 percent.

Two-thirds of all Swedes think Sweden is a good country to live in. That is an increase of 10 percent since the fall of 1984.

Two years ago, one in four people believed that Sweden can stay outside of a major conflict in Europe; this year one in five gave that response.

The topical issue of defense costs was also analyzed. More people had a positive attitude toward higher costs, 31 instead of 29 percent. That is the highest level recorded since 1957.

As usual, Conservatives were most positive about higher costs, 56 percent. They were followed by Center supporters, 32 percent, Liberals, 31 percent, Social Democrats, 23 percent and Left-Communists, 8 percent.

## NEWSPAPERS TAKE SIDES IN INCREASINGLY BITTER DEFENSE DEBATE

## Conservative Paper Attacks Westerberg

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Westerberg the Betrayer"]

[Text] Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg is upset. He spoke resentfully on the radio of the fact that Conservative Carl Bildt passed on confidential information. Apparently Westerberg told Bildt about his auxiliary contacts with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson on the defense issue. And Bildt then had the nerve to tell the Swedish people what is really going on in the closed rooms where the future of Sweden's security policy is being discussed.

Bengt Westerberg and Carl Bildt will have to work out their personal relations themselves. But we have a hard time taking the Liberal leader's injured tone seriously.

Sweden's peace and freedom are actually matters that concern all the nation's citizens. The strength of our defense for the rest of this century is not just a question for party leaders and members of the current Defense Committee. It can never be wrong to try to tell a broader group of people outside the closed doors of the meeting room what is really going on. The secretiveness that has characterized defense deliberations is disturbing and not in accord with the democratic decision-making process.

It is also hard to escape the impression that Bengt Westerberg's aversion to letting the public know what is going on is a result of the Liberal Party's weak position on defense. It was Westerberg himself who presented the Liberal Party line in a speech in Boden just a year ago. After a gloomy description of Sweden's security policy situation and the development of Swedish defense, the Liberal Party leader stated:

"It is our opinion that the spending level must be higher than an extension of the current economic limits. That is the main alternative in the government's planning directive. We feel that attention should be given instead to the upper part of the economic spectrum that was mentioned in the directive."

The upper part of the economic spectrum that Bengt Westerberg referred to involved funding increases of either 400 or 600 million kronor a year. In his "Program Plan for Military Defense, 1987-92," the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces [OB] went into what such increments would mean for the reinforcement of our defense forces. The results would be very modest. At the highest level mentioned we would end up with more transport helicopters, a few more heavy helicopters for hunting submarines, four light transport planes, better protection from shell splinters, a new air defense battalion and more coastal corvettes. That is all the money could provide and here the commander has extended his forecast to 1997.

As the OB stated these spending levels involve an increased risk and a reduced defense force compared to other countries. This will not enable us to make up for the rapid decline in recent decades when half the fleet and air force was phased out.

Instead Bengt Westerberg is now emphatically reiterating the Liberal Party's opposition to further Viggen fighter planes for our greatly depleted air defense system. He is just as emphatically rejecting the idea of more coastal corvettes and says he would like to put the money into submarine defense instead. But one of the duties of coastal corvettes--especially in peacetime--is to chase foreign intruders in our waters and archipelagoes. It is understandable that naval officers have reacted extremely sharply to the Liberal Party leader's message.

During his period as party leader Bengt Westerberg has made several interesting speeches on security policy. He has rejected all kinds of wishy-washy theories. Westerberg has repeatedly pointed to the danger of undemocratic systems, with express reference to the Soviet Union. For example, in a speech in Vanersborg 2 years ago, he said:

"A dictatorship is never stable. It is based on human submission and degradation. It is shaken by internal power struggles. Uncertainty about which means--in the area of both domestic and foreign policy--the rulers will resort to in order to preserve or consolidate their power also makes world peace uncertain. Therefore, as I see it, there is one factor that more than any other would radically improve the chances of lasting peace--the transformation of the Soviet Union into a democracy."

As far as we know there is no immediate prospect of any such transformation. For Sweden's part we can note that we have had about as many submarine violations in the third quarter of this year as we had in all of 1985. In this situation the Liberal leader is primarily concerned with the standard line of right-wing policy and is apparently willing to enter into agreements that would continue the erosion of our defense capability.

This is depressing and a betrayal of the possibilities that exist of defending the peace and freedom of Sweden.

## Liberal Paper Blames Bildt

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Subterfuge on Bildt's Party"]

[Text] A television conversation between Ingvar Carlsson and Bengt Westerberg can hardly be sufficient reason for the Conservatives to abandon hope of a four-party agreement on defense. There is no evidence for Carl Bildt's assertion that the Social Democrats are putting pressure on the Liberals to enter into a separate agreement. The Conservative leader's move seems to be based primarily on subterfuge and insinuation.

There is no question yet of any serious defection from the current talks among party leaders on defense. But in practice Bildt has decided to issue an ultimatum on his own priorities. If the other parties will not agree to increase the number of Viggen airplanes and coastal corvettes, the Conservatives would obviously prefer to stay outside any agreement.

One might get the impression from this that the Conservatives have a considerably higher level of ambition than the other parties. This is hardly an accurate picture as far as the Liberal and Center parties are concerned. All three parties have recently argued for a budget increase of around 7 billion kronor for the next 5 years, while the Social Democratic bid lies at a level of around 5 billion kronor for the same period.

The difference among the nonsocialist parties is more about how the defense money should be spent. While the Conservatives want to increase the number of Viggen airplanes and coastal corvettes, the Liberal Party feels it is more important to invest in more submarines and in developing a Swedish radar air-to-air missile for the coming JAS airplane. On the question of a radar air-to-air missile the Liberals and the Social Democrats agree that it would be better to invest in a Swedish weapons system, while the Conservatives feel we can buy weapons for the JAS planes from the United States.

As so often happens, the Swedish alternative will be more expensive, at least in the short run. But the advantage of a radar air-to-air missile that is developed by Swedish industry is that it will presumably be of higher quality than the missiles we might be able to purchase from other countries. From the point of view of security policy it is an advantage if the risk of being subject to a possible U.S. embargo can be avoided and from the point of view of industrial policy, this would stimulate domestic high technology development.

The definitive decision on the acquisition of radar air-to-air missiles will be made later. What the controversy involves now is whether we should pay a certain price to retain our freedom of action to make such a decision--or whether the money should be spent on immediate needs instead, as the Conservatives would like. Differences of opinion on this point scarcely constitute a reason for giving up altogether.

As Carl Bildt said in his speech it is a positive sign that the Social Democrats are now prepared to discuss certain budget increases for military defense. It is also clear that the Social Democrats will have to come very close to the funding level discussed by the nonsocialist party leaders if they want to get any kind of compromise agreement. Ingvar Carlsson will have to extend himself to the utmost to achieve a compromise unless he wants to be forced to push through a defense budget with the help of the Left-Communist Party.

The government has strong reasons to prevent defense policy from becoming a divisive bloc issue. The security policy interpretation of a defense resolution that was brought about on this basis would be generally negative. From a defense policy point of view the relatively small budget increases would leave big problems unsolved. The Social Democrats who have seen the need for a break in the defense policy trend also know that this cannot be accomplished without help from the nonsocialists.

The initial position for the opposition parties who want an agreement should still be fairly good. However there is not much room for trimming the 7 billion kronor funding level the nonsocialists are discussing, whether or not the Conservatives eventually decide to cooperate.

What is left is the impression that with his move Carl Bildt chose to put party tactics above concern for defense. It would still be a positive thing for security policy if he decides to back a four-party agreement in the end.

#### Parties' Defense Position Viewed

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial: "What the Defense Squabble is All About"]

[Text] The open conflict over the defense issue between Carl Bildt and Bengt Westerberg should be settled since the Conservative leader has also had occasion to talk to Ingvar Carlsson. But it will not be possible for either of the combatants to forget the pinpricks that were inflicted in the heat of the battle. Political editor Mats Svegfors recently stated in SVENSKA DAGBLADET that "round one" went to Westerberg; the sights are obviously set on an entire match.

In its news columns SVENSKA DAGBLADET has done its best to whip up fighting spirit. Recently the paper has been consistent in presenting the defense debate in such a way that the demands of the military and the Conservatives for reinforcements are set against the Liberal Party's aversion to these proposals. On one occasion just before Christmas the inaccuracies were so obvious that the paper's editorial board had to publish an apology after Westerberg objected.

What is the conflict all about from an objective point of view?



Most discussed is the question of whether to order more Viggen planes. The Conservatives and the Center Party are for this, while the Liberal Party--and in practice the Social Democrats as well--are not. The Liberal alternative initially was to put the Draken planes that have been deactivated back into operation but this was then changed to a recommendation to order more JAS planes instead.

The alternatives can be described by saying that in principle the Drakens would be ready for use almost immediately while the Viggens cannot be delivered before 1991 and more JAS planes--in addition to those that have already been ordered--would not be available before the late 1990's. However the acute personnel shortage in the air force meant that the Draken alternative, seen as a transitional solution while waiting for delivery of the JAS planes, had to be rejected. No one knows yet if the crisis can be alleviated in 4 or 5 years when more Viggens are scheduled for delivery.

If the air force could supply the manpower the addition of around 10 Viggens would mean that air defense would be strengthened more quickly than it would be by the acquisition of the JAS planes. But on the basis of cost per unit the Viggen is so much more expensive that for the same amount of money it would be possible to acquire a whole JAS division, in other words about 18 airplanes. Another advantage of the JAS is that the plane--in contrast to the Viggen--will remain effective for several decades into the next century.

Thus one could say that the military and the Conservatives are giving a high priority to the defense system of the 1990's. The Liberal Party is stressing the late 1990's and this includes its endorsement of the domestic development of a radar air-to-air missile for the JAS.

There are good arguments for both points of view; however we think ordering the Viggens would be much too expensive in relation to the defense effect. But to make problems like this understandable one needs a debate and newspaper reports that illuminate the issues instead of obscuring them. The recent maneuvers on defense have been designed for the already initiated.

6578

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## PAPER VIEWS OLOF JOHANSSON AS NEW CENTER PARTY CHAIRMAN

Some Criticize as 'Passive'

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 87 p 7

[Article by Ake Ekdahl: "Center Party Could Have New Chairman Soon"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The new chairman of the Center Party could be on the job by 1 March, elected by an extra party congress called for the end of February. Karin Soder's natural successor is the party's first vice chairman, Olof Johansson.

On Friday Olof Johansson called a meeting of the party's executive board for 7 January. The Riksdag group's council will meet at the same time. The party board is expected to announce an extra party congress for the purpose of electing a new party chairman that will be held in late February or early March at the latest.

The leadership of the Center Party is anxious to have the party chairmanship question settled quickly. In the position of weakness in which the party finds itself the situation would only become worse if there is a long period of uncertainty about who will lead the party. A quick decision is also regarded as favoring Olof Johansson, who is well-established in the party leadership ranks. He has been in the leadership for a long time and in recent months he has served as acting party leader in Soder's absence.

The alternative of waiting until the regular congress in June to elect a party leader involves the risk of starting new personality conflicts and would also mean lost time for the party to make up before next year's election.

#### Open Intrigues

When Falldin was ousted as party leader a year ago strong forces in the party wanted to have Olof Johansson as the new party leader. He indicated his interest too quickly which along with open intrigues behind the scenes was regarded as showing that Olof Johansson had taken part in the effort to get rid of Falldin. This turned out to be incorrect, but it was still a handicap when a successor was being named.

Then Karin Soder stepped in and behaved so well that Johansson was left in the party hierarchy as the chairman's first deputy.

Olof Johansson is a figure of controversy within the party. There are groups in the Center movement who would prefer another fresher person in the top role, but they have been unable to reach any agreement on a candidate to run against Olof Johansson.

The criticism of Johansson varies. Some say he was too passive in the fall as acting party chief and that he should have seized the chance to show his ability. Others feel that being vice chairman is like driving a car from the back seat and say that Johansson was deliberately lying low in order to avoid upsetting his chances of being elected later.

#### Unreliable

There is concern that Johansson is not reliable enough for a united non-socialist bloc. As chairman of the Stockholm Center branch he showed interest in red-green cooperation, which was blamed for the fact that the Center Party lost City Hall in the last election. Now in the new year Johansson has unexpectedly resigned as district chairman, citing an increased work load.

However some of Johansson's more spectacular actions during the time he was energy minister do not seem to have undermined confidence in him within the party. One time was when he stood on the ministry steps and spoke to young Center people about how to stop nuclear power. Another time was in 1978, when Falldin was forced to start up new nuclear plants and Johansson sent out his own memos with further conditions concerning dangerous radioactive waste.

Both events made Olof Johansson stand out as an extremely apologetic member of the nonsocialist coalition, especially in the eyes of Liberals and Conservatives.

However the party backed Johansson and in the end Falldin also decided to support his energy minister's points which were directly contrary to Conservative leader Gosta Bohman's talk about 99 percent safety.

Suspected of having his eye on a deal with the Social Democrats, distrusted for 10 years at the top of the party ladder during the party's decline and underrated for poor organization of his own paperwork and work hours, Olof Johansson still has no competition in his bid for the party chairmanship. Entirely on the basis of very broad capabilities.

"Of course the Center Party bears the mark of defeat and it takes time to win new supporters," Olof Johansson himself conceded in a comment on the problems of the Center Party.

#### New Brooms

In the choice between continuity and renewal when it comes to enhancing the Center Party's chances of making a comeback, Johansson said that the party is

working for continuity. This is an indirect answer to the question of what he thinks of the new brooms in the party leadership, such as nuclear power opponent General Lennart Daleus and others who have been mentioned in the debate on party chairman candidates.

Incidentally the extra congress in February-March at which the new chairman will be elected will be attended by the same delegates who went to last year's congress. This year's new congressional delegates will be chosen later this spring. That also suggests that the extra congress will quickly elect Johansson by acclamation.

With Johansson as party chairman the presidium will need a new vice chairman. Skane farmer Karl-Erik Olsson is now second vice chairman and could move up to become first vice chairman.

The Center Party should be able to come up with a woman to take his place, but there is a shortage of obvious candidates. Two people who have been mentioned are district nurse and Riksdag member from Vasterbotten Karin Israelsson and the young Bollnas doctor Helena Nilsson.

The latter is vice chairman of the Center Women's League.

Among male candidates an organizer like Riksdag member Per-Ola Eriksson and anti-nuclear power leader Daleus have been named. The points against Daleus are that he is a man, comes from Greater Stockholm and lacks both a seat in Riksdag and adequate political breadth.

#### Long on the Scene

Olof Johansson has long been part of the political scene. Energy, taxes, data and integrity are some special areas. He was Center Youth chairman from 1959 to 1971 and a member of the Center Party board since 1971. The same year he became a member of Riksdag, winning the post as second vice chairman in 1979 and moving up to first vice chairman in 1986. He was a district councillor in Stockholm in 1966-70 and was a cabinet minister, first serving as energy minister from 1976 to 1978 and then as minister of wages and salaries from 1979 to 1982.

He was born in Ljungby Parish in Kalmar County 50 years ago. Student, reserve officer and business college are some milestones in his career before he became a farm worker, a journalist, an office worker, a teacher, a representative and secretary of the Center Party's Riksdag group.

He has considerable political breadth and is seen as an effective speaker, good in TV appearances and a party leftist.

## Views on Alliance Unknown

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Center Line"]

[Text] After the departure of Thorbjorn Falldin in December 1985 the Center Party was in poor shape. Karin Soder was suddenly forced to take over the leadership and it was while she served as acting chairman up until the party congress in June that she made her biggest political contribution. She quickly succeeded in restoring unity and zest to the Center Party. In clear and simple language she dispelled the uncertainty about the party's political course. She won respect and everyone liked her.

She was party leader with her own mandate for such a short time that it is hardly worth trying to assess the contribution she made. She was not put to the test on any major controversial issue. Her unassuming manner and genuine good will were qualities that came into their own in a popular movement like the Center Party and thanks to her the party's situation seemed to stabilize to a great extent.

When the election committee looked around for a replacement for Falldin after the 1985 election defeat, Karin Soder had already indicated that she wanted to leave the party presidium. After making some inquiries the committee decided that Olof Johansson was the person the party would find it easiest to rally behind. The nomination was announced in connection with Falldin's resignation. This implied a link that suggested that Johansson was involved in the move against Falldin.

Olof Johansson turned out to be more controversial within the party than the election committee had suspected. People from Falldin's generation in leading inner party circles opposed his candidacy. Gunnar Hedlund said he doubted that Olof Johansson was forceful enough. Those who felt that way soon backed Karin Soder, who had the big advantage of being the candidate who was already leading the party.

Today Olof Johansson is acting party leader. The old leadership group around Falldin has more or less dispersed and has no candidate of its own to offer. Despite years in the government the party has few experienced politicians among those who are active today. Olof Johansson is the only one among those mentioned as candidates for the chairmanship who is widely known both inside and outside the party. He is a skillful advocate of Center policy and it will be strange if he is not chosen this time.

It is rumored that he is irresolute. He has a hard time giving clear orders. At least part of the explanation for this is the position he was in when Falldin was party leader. At an early point he stood out as a candidate for party leadership and as a politician with a broad spectrum of interests. Since his time in the youth movement he has been something of an opposite pole to the farmers in the party. He is a city dweller and "ideological" in a way that deviates from Center tradition.

This must have involved a difficult balancing act, especially under a party leader who ruled quite autocratically and never had any really close confidantes. Sometimes even his closest colleagues had a hard time grasping his political strategy. This was especially true with regard to the nuclear power issue during the first years in government, when Olof Johansson was energy minister, a job that could have made anyone schizophrenic.

There is some real uncertainty about Johansson's attitude toward nonsocialist cooperation. Both Bengt Westerberg and Karin Soder have shown that they regard the nonsocialist parties as a solid government alternative and things will not go well for the next Center leader if he vacillates on this central issue. Whatever the reasoning in inner party circles, experience has shown that nonsocialist voters want a united alternative to the Social Democrats. Not until such an alternative is fairly definite and credible can a middle party work for cooperation across bloc lines without giving the impression of being self-effacing. As acting party leader Olof Johansson should indicate how he views political cooperation patterns.

There has long been quite a bit of contradiction and lack of principle in Center policies, something that especially worries Conservatives and Liberals. Center people who were part of the government are well aware of the difficulty of pursuing their own party line in terms of practical actions. Falldin usually tried to pursue a strictly objective policy even if it sometimes collided with his own party program. He continued to do this even after he became part of the opposition in 1982, which contributed to the problems in the party.

The question that was not answered in Karin Soder's time is whether the Center Party intends to play a political role on major issues, as it did under Falldin, or whether it wants to create a safe niche as guardian of rural and environmental interests, possibly with the hope of being able to cast crucial swing votes. It would be a good thing if the debate prior to the party's important choice of chairman could clarify the lack of political realism in this last alternative.

6578

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## TURKEY'S ECONOMIC EXPANSION SEEN THREATENING NATION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4-5 Jan 87 p 1

[Article by Nikos Simou]

[Text] The Greek economic adversity, the inauspicious prospects again for this year, the high public debts and the non-existence of developmental programs make up the very great danger our country is encountering when juxtaposed with Turkey. As authoritative foreign political circles point out, Turkey is trying to strengthen itself, versus Greece, through its industrial development and the inflow of foreign capital into the country, as well as to consolidate the perception in Europe that, because of geographic reality, it is the natural bridge of the Old Continent with the Middle East and the wider Arab area. In this sense, Turkey's provocations in the Aegean are not only a sign of contentions, but also a diversion, the purpose of which is keeping Greece in constant defensive readiness at the expense of its economic development. The same political circles cite as proof the fact that the increase in Turkish credits to the armed forces--as emerges from the 1986 budgets--may be seven percent higher compared to the Greek credits, but Turkey's per-capita expenditure for the armed forces is far less than Greece's. Also, Turkey is superior from the standpoint of armament, at least as regards quantity. Moreover, for the first time, between Turkey's 1985 and 1986 budgets, the increase in the allocation to the armed forces is five percent lower this year.

## The Turkish Economy

The above conclusions of foreign political circles are based on a briefing made relatively recently by the Turkish prime minister to a group of foreign representatives of banks, war and non-war industries, atomic energy organizations, and also the EEC. It is characteristic that the Turkish prime minister, in the only mention he made of Greece, was a critic of the municipal election results. He attributed the voting against candidates supported by Papandreou's party not so much to the program of economic frugality as to the fact that, for a series of years, his government has not presented any developmental program. At precisely this point it should be noted that this observation of the Turkish prime minister gave foreign economic observers a sense of indirect disparagement of Greek possibilities since, in fact, the linking of the electoral result with the real retardation of any economic development in our country in recent years is a fairly persuasive element.

In contrast, Turkey, in the same sense it is projecting in NATO the picture of the better ally compared to Greece, is underlining to the western factor its developmental programs which are expressed by:

1. France's carrying out a series of important investments.
2. The signing of contracts with multinational companies after passage of the legislation concerning creation of a large number of free industrial zones.
3. The return of the war industry to the private sector (including multinational companies), with the only Turkish participation being the labor force.
4. The committal to a French-Turkish consortium of construction works for the natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union. It is considered an important success that the USSR agreed for Turkey to pay 70 percent of the value of the Soviet gas with exported Turkish products.
5. The start of collaboration with foreign companies to build one more bridge on the Bosphorus, an underwater tunnel for mainly tourist airfields and harbors.

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## CONCERN EXPRESSED ABOUT DOMESTIC DEBT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4-5 Jan 87 pp 1-2

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Excerpts] Implementation of the government's economic policy has begun with impediments in 1987 since, from the first day, it has stumbled against the chaos created in the market by application of the Value Added Tax (FPA) while, from another side, intense disagreements between the appropriate ministers thwarted, on 2 January, and surely for the last time, ratification of the bill on rents. These are the first threatening clouds, which cover on the horizon the storm which is coming, containing within itself more serious problems, such as swelling state deficits and the economy's inability to finance them.

## The Most Serious Threat in 1987

For 1987, independent observers note that, no matter how incredible this may seem, the most serious threat for the economy's equilibrium this year lies in wait on the side of domestic, not foreign, borrowing.

The development of the foreign and domestic public debt in recent years is the following, in million drachmas:

	<u>Foreign</u>	<u>Domestic</u>
1981	163,331	508,541
1982	234,769	693,521
1983	387,243	882,118
1984	623,557	1,259,212
1985	1,027,751	1,645,656
1986	1,193,892	1,873,757

Although one attribute of PASOK's five years in power is the increase in the foreign debt (it grew 7.3 times, versus 3.6 times for the domestic debt), nevertheless, for this year at least, the problems will arise mainly from the domestic debt. Moreover, let us not forget that, because of the devaluation of the drachma, the estimate of the foreign debt in drachmas creates false impressions.

The domestic debt, which is hard to contemplate, will burden this year's budget with 345 billion drachmas for servicing its interests alone, thus becoming the main source feeding the deficits. This is an avalanche which is growing year

after year, threatening to soon bury the whole economy. The case of IKA [Social Insurance Foundation] is typical; its cumulative debt already amounts to 250 billion drachmas. This means that for this year the leading insurance organization needs, beyond its administrative deficits, another 45 billion drachmas to pay interests alone!

It is clear that the draining of available funds by state deficits will result in a terrible tightening of credits to the private sector. The market will face phenomena of suffocating from credit asphyxiation.

Conversely, as concerns foreign borrowing, things do not seem dramatic for this year and, as long as the balance on current accounts deficit is held within the limits set by the government (1,250 million dollars), the problems which will emerge will not be major. More specifically, according to information from the appropriate ministries, the situation in foreign borrowing is shaping up as follows:

1986: Last year we borrowed from abroad approximately 2,550 million dollars, 600 million of which were appropriated to cover the balance on current accounts deficit, 450 million to lower the short-term debt (which has already been cut to 500 billion), 1,000 million to pay amortizations and 400 million to increase the exchange reserve, while 90 million dollars were appropriated to prepay amortizations of the 1988 fiscal year.

1987: If the balance's deficit is held at 1,250 million dollars, and presuming that the inflow of private capital will be around 1,000 million dollars, the borrowing needs will be: 250 million for the balance's deficit and 1,400 to pay amortizations; that is, 1,650 million dollars. Counter to these, already available are the second installment of the EEC loan, worth 900 million dollars, and 350 million dollars which are the loans we will receive from the European Investment Bank. Therefore, the need for new borrowing is restricted to 400 million dollars only, which can, of course, be easily found.

Despite these, since, with the granting of the EEC loan, the country's credit standing has improved and, moreover, since the situation in the international banking market is favorable (low interest rates and great liquidity), the Bank of Greece is considering "drawing" from foreign banks another 500 million dollars to prepay 1988 amortizations.

The same sources reported that the country's foreign debt at the end of 1986 was calculated to be 16.8 billion dollars, versus 15.2 at the end of 1985.

9247

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## ND'S ANNOUNCED ECONOMIC PROGRAM NOTED

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 23 Dec 86 p 2

[Text] Both the premier and the pro-government press continue to bring up a specious argument that can be critical for the future according to which: "Not even the official opposition has a credible alternative solution for the immediate future. In essence, the opposition does not disagree with the policy formulated by the government. Had it itself been in power today it would do no more or less." [Quoted from article by P. Loukakos, ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 21 Dec 86]

Actually (regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the particular program), the official opposition has submitted, both at its congress in Salonica and last September (speech at the Salonica Fair), a series of radically different postures from those of the government. More to the point, in its party program on the economy, the ND touches, among other matters, on:

Radical reduction (by 400 billion drachmae) of the greater public sector, which, with the 1987 budget, is expected to increase even more its participation in the GNP.

Connection between wages and productivity (in the private sector this is provided by non-taxable discounts from the profits for the sharing of the non-taxable productivity rewards and yield with the workers).

Immediate abolishment of a number of State intervention companies (AGREX, New AGREX, KFE, EMPO, Greek Pharmaceutical Industry, ITKO, K.A. Articles, K.T.E., etc.).

Abolishment of the administrative fixing of interest rates and the complicated system of controls and decontrols in force today.

Financing for all Greeks by all banks for all purposes and the abolishment of the present banking selective lending policies. The government will not act as a guardian of commercial banks.

Abolishment, in two stages, of all foreign exchange controls and the enrolling of the drachma in the ENS [European Monetary System].

Abolishment of the preferential borrowing by the government, which should turn to the free market for its loan needs. Prohibition of secret financing of the government by the Bank of Greece.

This is the case of a series of very substantial directives and measures that differ radically from the present policy of the administration. Until now, the official opposition has not begun to project and define certain specific aspects of its program (for example, whether there will be freedom to lay off workers). This, however, does not mean that the program of the official opposition can be blindly likened to that of the government by serious analysts, who surely must have studied it.

9731

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## SOMBER PREDICTIONS FOR 1987 BUYING POWER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28-29 Dec 86 p 4

[Article by Themos Anastasiadis]

[Text] Money does not bring happiness! Therefore, nothing stops us from saying with optimism, "Happy New Year," since money, at least, is not going to hinder us. Those who considered 1986 a year of frugality and had confidence in the government's promise that, beginning in 1987, we will truly see light at the end of the tunnel, can rest easy. The year which is leaving us, despite the fact it has been difficult, had absolutely no connection with real frugality, which the coming year will acquaint us with in all its grandeur. The three wisemen bearing gifts, instead of gold, frankincense and myrrh, are bringing the FPA [Value Added Tax], a further devaluation of the drachma and inflation, and their demeanor indicates they have come for a funeral rather than a birth. Precisely because this 1987 will be: The funeral of PASOK's stabilization program and the disclosure of the failure of the measures taken and of the deceit which, with no bad intention in the beginning but then consciously after a certain point on, has occurred at the Greek people's expense. The sacrifices to which they are subjected really have no guarantee, it is, literally, a useless (economic) bloodshed.

Without any doubt, in 1987 it will be shown that the special stabilization program of October 1985 had no chance of succeeding, as has been noted since the beginning by certain sides. Not because it was a planned error. The basic formula, and most of the measures, were a total copy of those which had been taken in other countries with a similar, if not so acute, problem. The program's failure emerged from the fact that it was not accompanied by a sincere political will for it to be implemented in all its dimensions, from the fact that it did not foresee that the forces of evil--waste, partisanship and corruption--nurtured by PASOK in the first four years are no longer easily tamed. And, finally, the most important, that it was not an integrated economic and political turn of the governing party, but a tactical maneuver which aimed at restricting, to the measure possible, the unfavorable consequences of the first four years and preparing for the second. It was, and is, a program to stabilize the government, not the economy.

At the level of the individual citizen, the repercussions were very serious in 1986 and in 1987, precisely because of the cumulative effect, they will assume a dramatic nature. Buying power in 1986, in the wage-earners' category, decreased 8 to 15 percent, analogous to the income level. In the lower categories

the decrease in buying power was in smaller percentages, but it was far more noticeable. Inflation fluctuated, at average levels, around 20 percent, if not higher, and the drachma slipped 12 percent compared to foreign currencies. Increases in salaries, correspondingly, were restricted to 11 percent, but only for the lower (50,000 and under) income scales. Taking into consideration that the ATA [Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment] for those earning between 60,000 and 120,000 drachmas is given with a 50-percent decrease (for the over 50,000-drachmas scale), the increases in this category are restricted to 7 to 8 percent. For those earning over 120,000 drachmas, who are no longer just a few, especially in the broader public sector and that controlled by the public (banks, insurance companies and DEKO [Public Firms and Organizations], a total of approximately 350 very large enterprises with hundreds of thousands of workers), the nominal increase in their salaries was cut to 3 to 5 percent, which means an actual decrease of the labor force by at least 15 percent.

For the remaining incomes (besides wage-earners), the effects were not so acute in 1986. Fifty percent of Greeks are self-employed (including farming). It is calculated that agricultural income increased 16 percent, while it is estimated urban, non-salaried incomes (from industry, commerce and, above all, the para-economy) stuck at, or slightly fell short of, the inflation level (20 to 22 percent). Demand in the market was maintained at unexpectedly (for the government) high levels, not so much because wage-earners used their savings (what savings?) but precisely because the remaining incomes increased at a rate much higher than expected. But also wage-earners, despite the fact their buying power was restricted, continued to maintain the same consumer habits (until they become aware of exactly what is happening...). Moreover, events such as "Chernobyl," or a subconscious anticipation of a devaluation and the FPA, contributed to the unnatural swelling of consumption.

#### New Decrease in Buying Power

In 1987 all this will change, and at the end of the year a very different picture will have been formed, unless there is a quiet turn in the income policy. First of all, the wage-earners' buying power will have a further decrease of 8 to 12 percent, or even more, for the "highly salaried." The ATA which it is forecast will be given for the whole year will not exceed 8 percent, this being valid, we remind you, for the up to 50,000-drachmas incomes (which no one envies!). For incomes between 60,000 and 120,000 drachmas, the increase in the nominal wages will be restricted to 4 to 5 percent and, for higher salaries, to 1 to 2 percent. The official inflation goal is 11 percent for the end of the year, and it may be achieved, just as 16 percent (16.5, to be precise) was achieved in 1986 (by freezing prices...). The average inflation, however, the thing which really hurts the consumer, will fluctuate between 15 and 17 percent, provided there is no unexpected (more than 5 to 6 percent) aggravation from the FPA.

With these premises, it is certain that there will be, for a second year in a row, a decrease in the wage-earners' income of 8 to 15 percent, with an average of 10 to 12 percent. It is calculated, moreover, that the drachma will slip 8 to 10 percent and, as a result, all imported products will become disproportionately more expensive, particularly luxury items which will be encumbered with the FPA's 36 percent. (After three to four months, some of these will cost 25 to 35 percent more than they do today.)

A noticeable shrinking is expected to be seen, however, in non-salaried incomes, both in agriculture and the urban sector. According to provisional estimations, the farming income will not increase more than 10 percent at current prices, while in industry and commerce, despite the fact it is impossible to make reliable calculations, it is estimated that a significant decline, in relation to 1986, will be observed. It is believed total demand will be drastically reduced, while the even greater curtailment of financing by the banks will squeeze the market zone even more.

#### Dark Prospects For 1988

There is, in other words, no doubt that, beginning in 1987, we will really come to understand what frugality is. The most disturbing thing, however, is that nothing guarantees that 1988 will be better or even that conditions are being created for a very slow recovery of the Greek economy. The effects of stabilization on the critical magnitudes are superficial and have a temporary nature:

1. It is well-known that the decrease in the balance on current accounts deficit, from 3,288 million dollars in 1985 to 1,800 million dollars in 1986, is owing to fuels and EEC inflow. Imports (except for fuels) increased instead of decreasing, while the timid increase in exports is in danger of becoming a thing of the past in 1987 following the abolishment of export subsidies. The enterprises' competitiveness was not improved by controlling the cost of labor because curtailed demand and the lack of confidence are wiping out investments. So, the target of 1,300 million dollars (deficit for the balance) in 1987, even if achieved, will have a clearly temporary, coincidental nature. As the SEV [Association of Greek Industrialists] has repeatedly noted, the Greek economy is in danger at any moment of a new relapse.
2. The deficits of the public, and the broader public sector, have not been restricted to the necessary degree; they remain at unallowable levels. The control seen in the ordinary budget is owing only to the increase in receipts (taxes), not the decrease in expenditures. The improvement which it is being attempted to project for the 53 public firms and organizations is false: The 40-billion-drachma decrease in their deficits came exclusively from DEI [Public Power Corporation] and OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization] which "as if by magic" became profitable. (Those who have received the latest electricity and telephone bills know why.) In the six other large public firms and organizations, the deficits have increased (for IKA [Social Insurance Foundation], for example, from 50 to 75 billion drachmas, for OAS [Urban Communications Organization], from 22 to 29 billion drachmas) while in the remaining "small" (a total of 45) enterprises, the deficits have more than quintupled from 1985 to 1986 (9,682, versus 1,782 million drachmas). Therefore, the public sector continues to play the same, if not a greater, destabilizing, counter-developmental, inflationary role, despite the fact that consumers are paying increased bills for its supposed restoration!

Developments in the Economy, 1985-1987  
(in percentages)

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Gross National Product	2.1	1	+ 0.5
Inflation	19.3	21	16
Increase in Wage-Earners' Salaries	16	10	6
Increase in Earnings of Self-Employed	20	18	14
Private Consumption	2.9	-0.5	-2
Public Consumption	2.2	1	0.5
Industrial Production	1.3	3	3
Total Demand	4.7	-0.8	-1.3

The data come from the OECD (ECONOMIC OUTLOOK), the Ministry of National Economy, and a confidential report in the ECONOMIST.

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## INCREASE IN OCTOBER PRIVATE DEPOSITS REPORTED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jan 87 p 7

[Text] Private deposits in banks and other credit institutions (except for the Bank of Greece) at the end of October 1986 amounted to 3,444,307 million drachmas, noting an increase, compared to the end of September, of 32,513 million drachmas. In October 1985, the increase was 28,092 million drachmas. In other words, in October 1986, there was a certain acceleration in the rate of increase, which is primarily due to the improvement in savings and term deposits.

In more detail, in October 1986, in relation to the same month in 1985, the following changes were noted:

1. Sight deposits increased 850 million drachmas, compared to 15,031.
2. Savings deposits increased 13,836, compared to 1,221.
3. Term deposits were up 16,576, versus 10,946.
4. Blocked deposits increased 1,251, versus 894.

Despite the improvement in October, the restricted increases in previous months resulted in the total increase in the ten-month period, January to October 1986, falling short of the increase in the same period last year. More specifically, the changes in private deposits, in million drachmas, in the ten-month period, January to October, in the last three years are the following:

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
A. PRIVATE, IN DRACHMAS	<u>+349,670</u>	<u>+435,700</u>	<u>+368,313</u>
a. Sight	+10,464	+11,783	-3,412
b. Savings	+194,707	+231,335	+212,458
c. Term	+140,149	+186,787	+153,253
d. Blocked	+4,350	+5,795	+6,014
B. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES	<u>+3,964</u>	<u>-5,735</u>	<u>-4,953</u>
C. PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS	<u>+8,156</u>	<u>+6,224</u>	<u>-6,861</u>

## OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS COUNTRY ENTERS NEW YEAR

## Problems Summarized

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 86 p 24

[Article: "Now Work Will Begin: These Are Norway's Economic Problems"]

[Text] For 1986 the deficit in the foreign balance will amount to 33 billion kroner, and it will reach 39 billion next year. For Mainland Norway (Norway without oil and shipping), the 1986 deficit will be 90 billion kroner and approximately 86 billion kroner next year. This means we are consuming much more than we earn.

The 1986 price increase seems to be 7.2 percent, and 8 percent next year--a much sharper price rise than our biggest trading partners. This means increased problems exporting Norwegian goods abroad.

The loss in oil revenues is huge. Taxes and fees from the oil sector fell from 51.5 billion kroner last year to approximately 35 billion in 1986. Next year taxes and fees will not amount to more than approximately 17.5 billion kroner.

Salary costs per manufactured unit in industry increased by a whole 6.75 percent in 1986. For our trading partners, salary costs did not increase by more than 2.5 percent. Between 1986 and 1987 wages will increase by 8.5 percent, and there is no room for anything else in the spring tariff adjustment.

Growth is weak. Mainland Norway's gross national produce will not rise by more than 1.5 percent next year. The overall gross national product will rise by 2.5 percent.

## Consciousness of Crisis Necessary

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 86 p 24

[Article by Cecilie Norland and Morten Wang: "La Dolce Vita Is Over"]

[Text] No big piece was left on the plate after Central Bank head Hermod Skanland had helped himself to the retrenchment cake AFTENPOSTEN had had specially baked--big, full of whipped cream and topped with a super-rich layer of marzipan. Also invited were one former and one present finance minister. Both Rolf Presthus and Gunnar Berge were appropriately modest, and anything else could scarcely have been expected after Skanland had set the tone.

The Central Bank head's careful moves with the cake server were the prelude to a discussion about what can and ought to be done to rectify the serious problems in the Norwegian economy before they become so large that the word crisis would be a mild way of describing them. A number of professional economists have answered the question before, and prescribed huge cuts in government expenditures, wage reductions for individuals and characterized the cutbacks recommended by the government as ludicrously small. Gambling with jobs and postponing problems are terms which have often been invoked.

The three gentlemen who sat erect on the uncomfortable conference sofa in the finance minister's office prescribed no drastic remedy and hinted at no miraculous measure. Their recipe is no whimsical shortcut; they suggest quite simply that the feast is over. We have to work more, consume less, keep within the limits of our revenue and go forward gently so as to avoid major injury.

### A Latin American Recipe

"First of all, we have to dispose of the notion that we are in the middle of a crisis--on the contrary, we are well into something which is the norm for most other countries. It is just the big oil revenues of the past ten years which have allowed Norway to live outside the usual laws of economics. We have consumed more than we have earned, and now we have to manage a normal situation with normal means such as, for instance, changes in the tax system," Skanland said.

His reply to the question "What do we do now?" was to perform a mental experiment. He suggested that Norway should undertake a tough program of the sort the International Monetary Fund would require from us before we reached a situation in which assistance from the IMF was the only remedy. The program might aim at banning all revenue linkages, liberalizing agricultural imports and combining these things with cash supports to farmers (something which would become much more reasonable), a phasing out of the tax-deductible interest regulation and a radical reorganization of the national banking system.

### Small Steps

"We have to set about on a gradual adjustment so domestic consumption will go down, and bring consumption more in conformity with what we produce ourselves and get goods and services sold," Gunnar Berge stated.

"Is that what the finance minister would ideally like to see come to pass, or are you talking about what is politically possible?"

"That is what constitutes the answer. In my estimation there is no other alternative," said Berge.

His predecessor broke in and suggested that what is being done is not enough. He thinks the situation may be even more serious than the already depressing description given in the national budget. Rolf Presthus gave special emphasis to two areas in which more has to be done. The first is public expenditures and the second is the determination of profits. "Raising taxes and duties will not be of much help if it then results in wage increases over which there is no control," he said.

### Forty-Hour Work Week

Skanland did not stop at suggesting an IMF program. He also believed that a 40-hour work week for everyone--without more weekly pay--would contribute significantly to economic revival. Both Berge and Presthus were willing to discuss the suggestion. By the very fact that the aim of the much discussed and costly shortening of work hours was the same work time for everyone, they were not at all against the notion of more work hours for some groups--although some of them hinted that it would be formalized in the near future.

"So we know something about what you want to do, but are the retrenchments in next year's national budget large enough to straighten out the Norwegian economy?"

"The retrenchments are large enough if the assumptions hold. If the municipal sector keeps within its limits, and the parties in economic life accept the fact that there is little room for any wage adjustment before spring. The upward creep of wages is the reason for this, plus the fact that the danger is too great," Berge said.

At this point Skanland stated diplomatically that it would be hard to say that the retrenchments were large enough. "Over a period of four to five years, we have to cut expenses by about 10 billion kroner, and it would have been better had more retrenchments been made when the labor market was tight, even if a 1.5 percent cut in gross national product next year is not so bad," said the head of the Central Bank.

Presthus was not undiplomatic either, but he was a good deal tougher nevertheless: "It is possible to limit the state's expenditures further, and the government is not going far enough. The Conservative Party has suggested major retrenchments and is willing to discuss even bigger ones," said the former finance minister.

#### Law Against Wage Bonus?

"A spring settlement for no wage increase is the key if the government's economic ideas are to hold. But, on the whole, is it possible to manage the wage trend when the labor market will remain tight and close to 90 percent of wage bonuses are awarded locally?"

None of the three had problems acknowledging management difficulties. Presthus said that before the spring it would not be sufficient to put trust in the sense of responsibility of the parties in economic life, and that the government must set limits for wage increases. "The Conservative Party will be glad to cooperate if there is legal authority for such limits for which the government needs Parliament's cooperation," Presthus said. He would not be more precise, however. That could "straitjacket the parties beforehand."

"To the extent that both employees and employers are convinced that 1987 will be the last year with a tight labor market--in which there is a manpower shortage in a number of areas--it might still be the case that there will be a somewhat smaller appetite for undermining the situation," Skanland said. He thinks there can hardly be a scenario with a labor market which is not as tight before the second half of 1987 at the earliest.

Gunnar Berge did not wish to join the debate about legal authority for regulating wage increases, but said that the government planned on doing much more than making appeals to the parties, and that there already exists a concept which will be discussed with one and all after Christmas. To this Presthus replied that he hoped discussions over Christmas would be soon enough. In his opinion, discussions should already have taken place.

Finance Minister Berge stressed the fact that new wage bonuses cannot be given out if constantly discussed competitiveness does not get worse than it already is. He pointed out that responsibility for the course of events rested with government and parliament but with other important players such as labor groups as well.

There was great scepticism around the table, however. This cannot possibly continue. Rolf Presthus believes the government's calculations are somewhat too optimistic. Nonetheless the three agreed that the tax burden would increase in the coming years.

#### Avoid Oil Blunder

"In the debate over whether next year's retrenchments are large enough, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range perspective. The most important thing is to begin work in all those areas in which we need profound changes, for instance in regulations, changes which will produce effects all the way into the 1990's. I am more afraid of being stuck here than of cutting too little this year," Skanland said.

Berge pointed to the need for continued investment in the continental shelf and for stimulating new growth. He expressed his hope that we would see a return of high oil revenues. Skanland also thought that we would see a higher oil price again but warned against viewing future oil revenues as a life jacket.

"Before oil revenues flooded over us, we were going in the right direction. We witnessed an improvement in productivity before we began using our oil revenue to improve our standard of living. If and when North Sea revenues go up again, we have to have learned our lesson. A mechanism must be created which will prevent these revenues from trickling into the national budget," Skanland said. Berge supported his notion of a "buffer fund." Presthus as well stressed the fact that we should not again believe we could push necessary industrial reorganization to one side in the face of the black gold from offshore.

#### Awareness of the Crisis

"What do the three of you think is the people's awareness of this crisis?"

"It is really the politicians' responsibility to create the proper crisis awareness," Berge said, while Skanland reacted immediately to the label crisis being attached to the current situation: "It is atypical in a crisis situation to have to manage with what you earn."

Gunnar Berge brought the negative rate of savings into the debate and said that a marked increase in savings would bring with it a substantial tightening up. Skanland did not find this so unrealistic. "Most people are now so deep in debt that they want to save more," he said.

"Have the three of you reduced your own consumption?"

"As a cabinet minister I have noticed that I do not have time to spend money," Berge said. Rolf Presthus pointed to the notches in his belt and, with a smile, observed that he had taken Berge's advice and tightened his belt.

#### Oil Price 'Shock' Viewed

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 86 p 25

[Article by Flemming Dahl and Morten Woldsdal: "The Drop In the Price of Oil--A Painful Experience: Oil Shock For Norway and Three Finance Ministers"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] This year the sharp drop in the price of oil has created a major headache for three Norwegian finance ministers. During 1986 Rolf Presthus, Arne Skauge and Gunnar Berge have all been made painfully aware of how vulnerable the Norwegian economy has become to fluctuations in the price of crude oil.

For the foreseeable future, last year, 1985, will be seen as the record year for Norwegian oil revenues. In 1985 oil companies paid 46.7 billion kroner in taxes and duties to the state. This year that amount was reduced to approximately 36 billion, while next year oil revenues are estimated at 15 billion kroner, with an oil price of \$15 per barrel and an exchange rate of seven kroner to the dollar.

As far back as the fall of 1985, fear began to spread in the Finance Ministry in Oslo. In the Ministry's old offices, people wondered whether assumptions in the national budget about a price of oil of \$25 per barrel in 1986 might not perhaps be too optimistic. That they were, this we know today. During the spring, when the OPEC countries pushed oil production up and oil prices down, and the seriousness of the situation gradually dawned on then Finance Minister Presthus, the nonsocialist government came forward with its famous "Easter package." In part, significant retrenchments had to occur to compensate for the drop in oil revenues. On 29 April it became clear that Prime Minister Kare Willoch, after having asked for a vote of confidence, found a majority in parliament against him in the so-called gasoline tax affair. The change of government was a fact.

One of the first matters the new government tackled was initiating cooperation with OPEC. The nonsocialist government had consistently opposed all pushes for cooperation from the organization.

Oil and Energy Minister Arne Oien rapidly became "OPEC's best friend." A series of meetings between him and principal OPEC minister followed at home and abroad. From being one of OPEC's "enemies," against which the organization's price war policy was directed, Norway became "the nicest boy in the class." The result of this was that Norwegian oil exports were temporarily reduced by 10 percent in November and December.

The Labor Party government cooperated with OPEC in the hope that it could help bring oil prices--and Norwegian oil revenues with them--back up again. If the Norwegian moves have not had any particular effect on the glut situation in the oil market, they have most likely had psychological significance for the work which the OPEC countries are doing to stabilize oil prices at a higher level. For the time being, the Norwegian government is assessing how it may pursue cooperative measures in 1987.

#### Offshore Industries Hit

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Dec 86 p 25

[Article: "Lost Jobs"]

[Text] The fall in the price of oil has forced oil companies to pinch pennies--a move which has meant fewer orders to their suppliers of goods and services. In the wake of this development, in Norway alone several thousand jobs have been lost, and more are in danger.

Rough estimates show that this year the oil companies had investment and expenditures budgets which are 20-30 percent lower than what they would have been if oil prices had held at last year's level.

Not the least result of this has manifested itself in the amounts of money the companies have put into exploring for new oil and gas fields. Especially affected are owners of drilling rigs and special ships used by the oil

companies in their exploratory operations.

Last year approximately 50 holes were drilled in connection with offshore exploratory activity, while this year about 35 will be drilled and next year even fewer. Industry specialists assume that the figure for this year would have been as high as last year's if oil prices had not fallen.

#### Stockpiled

The situation for mobile drills (mainly drilling rigs but also housing and other special rigs) is the following: of the approximately 50 which are Norwegian-owned or controlled, a good 30 are stockpiled.

This is the situation for supply and other special ships: of the approximately 200 which are Norwegian-owned or controlled, more than 60 are stockpiled.

The situation in riggers and special ships has meant that shipping companies which own any of them have fired or given short-term layoff notices to about 3,000 men.

"It is clear that a number of owners are not earning enough to cover their debt or interest," said Erik Aamot of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association. But he pointed out that banks and financial institutions are contributing to amicable solutions if for no other reason than because it can serve them best in the long run.

Furthermore Aamot thinks the restructuring measures taken by the industry can help see to it that when the oil price crisis is past there will be a number of viable firms of drilling and special ships in Norway.

The crisis has produced rather dramatic results in the oil companies' number of accounts, despite belt-tightening. The three Norwegian companies are among those affected.

#### Stock Market Alarmed

During the first six months of this year, Statoil's surplus was reduced by about half. Norsk Hydro's showing alarmed the stock market. Saga Petroleum has reached such an impasse that the company is looking for support in the form of cooperation with a foreign, financially stronger company.

But when that segment of the Norwegian engineering industry which lives by jobs from the oil companies looks at periods of crisis, it does not initially do so in the context of the drop in the price of oil. If anything, the reason for this is that in recent years oil companies and authorities, even before they saw the price drop coming, made few decisions to expand new oil and gas fields so as to keep the expansion level up.

Only in a few years' time, and then only to the extent that decisions about field expansions have to be postponed owing to fears of dramatically low oil prices through the 1990's, will the engineering industry be seriously affected by the drop in the price of oil.



"Today, generally speaking, Norwegian industry has not been greatly affected by the drop in the price of oil," said Lars Thomas Dyrhaug, a consultant at the Federation of Norwegian Industries, as he emphasized that firms of drilling and special ships were excluded from his assessment.

But since the price drop affects all of Norway's economy, Dyrhaug suspects that something which results in retrenchments in the average Norwegian's pocketbook will mean reduced purchases of goods and services and thereby growing problems for industry next year. Kjell Stahl, the head of the Directorate of Labor, also sees Norwegian jobs threatened. "We are entering a period of extreme uncertainty in 1987, because retrenchments may very well hit hard," he said.

But he does not exclude the possibility that political countermeasures may be enacted to halt the elimination of firms which had been marked for death. This is one reason he will not for the time being put a firm number on the jobs which are in danger.

#### Oil Production Increased In 1986

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Jan 87 p 18

[Article: "Oil-Norway: Less Exploration, Increased Production"]

[Text] Stavanger (NORWEGIAN NEWS AGENCY)--Norwegian offshore exploratory activity is rapidly declining, figures obtained from operators by the NORWEGIAN NEWS AGENCY show. The year-end total for 1986 was 37 closed down and started wells, against 51 drillings in 1985. This means that last year's activity is a good 70 percent of the preceding year's.

Next year the companies have budgeted for 25 drillings, most of which will be on the Haltenbank in connection with the 11th licensing round.

Most of the year's drilling occurred in the first six months of 1986. After the big drop in oil prices, there were only 12 drillings in the second half of the year.

At the same time oil and gas production increased by 6 percent in 1986 and will yield 68 million tons of oil units. Oil production has increased from 38.4 to 42 million tons, while gas production is at about the same level as previously. The reason for the increase in oil production is that, for the first time, the Statfjord C platform has been operation for a whole year. Furthermore oil is coming from the Ula field and from the production ship "Petrojari" at Oseberg.

MAP CAPTION

**Trend in Taxes and Duties Paid by Oil and Gas Activity, in Billions of Kroner**

Norway plays a role in the international oil game through the activity of the oil companies in the North Sea--here represented by some of the "seven sisters" companies.

Daily news from the international oil market had a strong effect on this year's activity on the Norwegian shelf.

The fall in oil prices also produced major political consequences in Norway, when the nonsocialist government was brought down by a measure to increase the tax on gasoline.

It was the OPEC countries--and especially the big Middle Eastern producers--who opened up the oil spigots and pushed prices down.

Most recently the players in the oil market have sat and waited for new news from the OPEC countries which could lead to changes in oil prices.

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## MAJOR COMBINED ARMS TRAINING EXERCISE TESTS AREA DEFENSE

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Jan 87 pp 4-8

[Article by Josef Pechmann, Vienna: "Major Exercise of the Federal Armed Forces in Styria"]

[Text] One of the largest exercises in the 30-year history of the Austrian Bundesheer [Federal Armed Forces] took place in Styria from 6-17 October 1986. The participants were about 23,000 military personnel--in fact, there were more than 30,000 throughout the entire period of the exercise--, about 5,000 wheeled vehicles, about 300 armored vehicles as well as fighter-bombers, surface vehicles and helicopters. They practiced defense, harassment operations, air defense and mobilization. Soldiers from all the Federal provinces--mainly militiamen--were deployed in Upper and eastern Styria; contiguous districts of the Salzburg, Carinthia and Burgenland provinces were included as exercise areas also.

The Bundesheer conducts exercises of this magnitude only every 3 to 4 years; the last one took place in Lower Austria in 1979 and in Tirol in 1982. The official title of the exercise was "Raumverteidigungsuebung-Herbstuebungen 86 (RVUe-HUe 86)" [Area Defense Exercise-Fall Exercises 86]. In contrast to former area defense exercises, which concentrated mainly on testing various defense sub-components, this one was planned and conducted as a training exercise. Operational-tactical linkage was purposely subordinated to training practice; repeat performances of individual phases had been planned from the beginning as an essential element of this training exercise. It was therefore not the traditional maneuver with adversaries, one of whom would be the winner and the other the loser; rather, several independent combat exercises were combined into a training exercise defined by time and area. The primary objectives of the exercise were the following:

- to maintain or even improve upon the level of training of the participating troops;
- to gain confidence in individual combat capability and proficiency, and in the commanders;
- to elicit optimum performance from soldiers and equipment under realistic simulated combat conditions.

The following were the individual combat exercise phases:

#### Preliminary Phase:

Air and air defense exercise, 6-10 October in the area Aichfeld-Murboden in Upper Styria and in the Packsattel area (western Styria/Carinthia). Here the training objectives were the installation and operation of operational and combat air bases, the use of air defense for the protection of an operational air base and for area defense; and finally, the decentralization of air supply and maintenance installations.

#### Main Phase:

Defense exercise, 9-17 October in the area Aichfeld-Murboden, Poelsbach Valley, Scheifling, Murau, Oberwoelz and in Lungau (Salzburg province). Here the training subjects were the construction of emplacements in minimum time; conducting defensive operations making use of beneficial terrain features and as a combined arms operation; and finally, the destruction of penetrated enemy forces by friendly forces brought in for this purpose.

As part of the main phase, certain elements of the medical services of the buildup and departure organization established and practiced an independent medical service exercise throughout the entire area of the defense exercise. The purpose of this exercise was to test the effectiveness of the chain of medical care from the point where wounds are sustained to the final care installation while making optimum use of medical facilities at individual levels of command.

#### Secondary Phase:

Area defense exercise, 9-17 October in the area Fischbach Alps, Birkfeld, Passail and Hartberg in eastern Styria. Training subjects were: entering and preparation of an operational zone; establishing observation and check points; preparing and activating terrain barriers; and executing ambushes, surprise attacks and harassment operations.

During the same period, 6-10 October, there was a mobilization exercise in the home defense barracks of St Michael in eastern Styria. This involved an examination of preparatory alerting and mobilization procedures with respect to their sequence, personnel and equipment aspects, but disregarding any procedures overlapping with civilian ones.

Live ammunition firing training was primarily conducted at firing ranges in the exercise areas and in open terrain. In addition, characteristic exercise events were demonstrated at the Seetal troop exercise area by combat firing of heavy weapons and fighter bombers.

Corps Command I (Graz), headed by Corps Commander Eduard Fally, was in overall charge of the exercise. Participating in this command function was the air division of the Air and Air Defense Training Command (Major General Othmar Pabisch) and the command of the Theresian Military Academy for the area defense exercise (Maj Gen Adolf-Erwin Felber).

## Chronology of the Exercise

The first attacks incident to the major exercise took place on Tuesday, 7 October. Fighter bombers and combat helicopters attacked antiaircraft batteries stationed at Pack and at the Zeltweg air base. During the entire exercise, the attacking aircraft flew about 400 sorties with about 100 aerial vehicles. Among other things, they simulated the use of chemical agents. While the air defense used the most modern radar-guided guns, these have a maximum effective radius of only 4 km. One of the results of this exercise is the confirmation of the long-recognized fact that battlefield guided missiles are needed to conduct an effective defense. The exercise director noted that this involved a political matter; in its final report the Bundesheer would state the problem, "but someone else is going to have to act on it."

On Monday, 13 October, the 4th Armored Infantry Brigade initiated the defense exercise in Upper Styria from its assembly areas between Knittelfeld and Unzmarkt with combat reconnaissance and attacks upon the outposts of the Blue Force. The attack was directed against the 5th Styrian Motorized Infantry Brigade in the Poelsbach Valley and the 4th Upper Austrian Motorized Infantry Brigade in the area Scheifling-Murau. During the subsequent days the Orange Force 4th Armored Infantry Brigade attempted to continue the attack and also deployed the airborne battalion for this purpose.

On Wednesday the Blue Force brought up the 8th Motorized Infantry Brigade for reinforcement and on Thursday the Orange Force was counterattacked and pushed back.

In the Area Security Exercise in eastern Styria the attacker advanced during the night before Monday, 13 October, from the southern part of Burgenland province in the direction of Vorau and Hartberg with the intention of penetrating into the Muerz Valley across the Fischbach Alps. The 51st Home Defense Battalion conducted the battle in the area security zone by engaging in such harassment operations as ambushes or raids against Orange transport columns, command posts, communications installations etc. Using these tactics of "a thousand pinpricks," the militia soldiers attempted to stop the attacker's forward thrust. Of particular significance in this area was the crossing of the "Schanz" near Fischbach. Observers from the CSCE states, military attaches, politicians and domestic and foreign journalists witnessed an impressive demonstration of how the attacker, who tried to escape through an adjoining valley, could be successfully ambushed.

### Maneuver Observers from all over the World

In this context we must mention that Austria is showing leadership by example within the framework of the CSCE. Even though the rules concerning maneuvers, which were agreed upon at the last conference, will not be effective until the start of the new year, Austria voluntarily opened the fall exercises to observers from the CSCE states. Twenty-one of the 34 member countries accepted the invitation and sent 33 high-ranking observers.

Among the interested observers were Federal President Dr Waldheim in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the Bundesheer; Defense Minister Dr Kruenes, who made numerous unannounced appearances among the troops; politicians of all parties and journalists from the East and West. They were shepherded by a press and information team, which in addition performed multifaceted public relations functions. It arranged exhibits in various locations throughout the exercise area on the subject "Area Defense and the Militia;" a large information and equipment exhibit; sporting events featuring leading Bundesheer athletes in schools; field and special post offices with special events cancellations; concerts for the benefit of charitable causes; musical request programs for soldiers on the radio; well-known Austrian TV Channel 3 talk show hosts, serving as volunteers in the military exercise, acted as disk jockeys in discotheques in the exercise areas; there was a "distress hot-line" for telephone information, suggestions, requests and complaints; and, during the exercise, two issues of a maneuver newspaper with an edition of 170,000 were distributed to all soldiers and all households within the exercise area. Finally, there were wreath layings, band concerts, field masses and other religious services in many locations; and at the end of the maneuvers, several parades with great attendance by locals.

#### A Preliminary Critique

The director of the exercise, Corps Commander Fally, thanked the civilian population during a final press conference for its forbearance and cooperation. In the exercise, he said, "there had been many highlights, but also some gray areas." The militia soldiers had in some instances been pushed to the brink of their physical tolerance. Fally indicated that qualitative improvements could be made at the lower levels and that there had been equipment deficiencies. Terrain damage had been minimal--the beautiful dry fall weather had contributed to that. He was glad about the small number of accidents and traffic incidents, none of which resulted in serious injury. Also, an excellent showing in the area of discipline: not a single disciplinary incident among the more than 30,000 military personnel participating.

Army Chief of Staff General Hannes Philip too indicated his satisfaction over the results of RVUe-HUe 86, the "first large-scale Bundesheer exercise testing militia performance." He stated that in the exercise he had detected nothing that "could not be fixed." The Army commander did find some deficiencies in the rate of reporting for duty and in the training methodology used for militiamen. Greater efforts must be made in the future, he said, to make the public understand that exercises can be successful only if the rate of reservists reporting for duty were as high as possible. Generally, he continued, the exercise had proven that the system of area defense based on the militia was an effective one.

[Box, p 8]

The following elements participated in "RVUe-HUe 86":

From the Readiness Force: the 4th Armored Infantry Brigade, the Army Reconnaissance Battalion, the 21st, 23rd, 25th and 26th Motorized Infantry


Battalions, the 4th and 7th Tank Destroyer Battalions, the 2nd and 3rd Air Defense Battalions, the 2nd Army Engineer Battalion and the 1st Corps Artillery Battalion;

From the Air Division: the 2nd Air Regiment, parts of the 1st and 3rd Air Regiments and the Air Staff Battalion;

From the Mobile Home Defense Force: the 4th, 5th and 8th Motorized Infantry Brigades;

From the Stationary Home Defense Force: the 51st and 55th Home Defense Permanent Regiments;

From the Command, Supply and Support Force: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Communications Battalions; the 2nd and 3rd Supply Regiments, the 2nd and 3rd Engineer Battalions, the Army Communications Regiment, and supply elements of the Army Logistics Command.



Key:

- |  |                                 |
|--|---------------------------------|
| 1. [Title] Exercise Areas in Styria            | 4. Area security exercise       |
| 2. Maneuver area                               | 5. Mobilization exercise        |
| 3. Defense exercise; medical services exercise | 6. Air and air defense exercise |
|  | 7. Combat firing                |

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## CIVIL DEFENSE ASSESSED WITHIN NATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Cologne ZIVILSCHUTZ MAGAZIN in German Sep 86 pp 6-9

[Article by Gen Harald Wust, retired, former Armed Forces Chief of Staff:  
"Civil Defense from the Military Viewpoint"]

[Text] Report by the former chief of staff of the Bundeswehr on the occasion of a speech for the Society for Berlin Civil Defense in the old REICHSTAG building.

The Society for Civil Defense in Berlin (GSZ) held a conference, "Discussions on Civil Defense," on 5 May 1986 in the old REICHSTAG building. The moderator was Bundestag representative Joachim Kalisch.

Speakers included State Secretary Muellenbrock as senator for the interior, the president of the Federal Office for Civil Defense, Dusch, and General Harald Wust, former chief of staff of the armed forces. Event participants included catastrophe defense delegates and official specialists of the Berlin office, members of the Internal Company Security Working Group of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Berlin, members of the catastrophe support service associated organizations, and members of the Berlin parliament as well as the GSZ.

In view of the basic statements made on civil defense, the ZS Magazine publishes individual contributions, beginning with General Wust's.

"Naturally in this country we stand up for humanity and for the defense of law and freedom. Nevertheless we avoid the obligation of discussing objectively the dangers to our country and its citizens in cases of catastrophes, of which the most extreme is war. One of the consequences of this avoidance is a general lack of information on the relationship between the security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany and its civil defense. The result of making such important problems a taboo is that our civil defense as a whole, is somewhat deficient. And still worse: Civil defense has become a political point of controversy. And the country and society have been affected in that a number of politicians and political groups are using this topic to spread fear and hopelessness instead of, as they should, instilling a sense of trust and confidence to act on the issue.



One of the characteristics of our country is to ignore lessons, particularly those bitter lessons of history. Because the Germans in particular have had to learn in a sorrowful way how important effective civil defense is in time of war and what it means to expose an unprotected population to acts of war. Anyone addressing the topic of civil defense who does not wish to consider the possibility of war shows how little he knows about the peace-oriented policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The theme of my address, "Civil Defense from the Military Viewpoint," brings to mind two questions:

1. What security/political significance does civil defense have in the framework of German peace policy?
2. What does civil defense mean for the common citizen?

#### The Security Political Significance of Civil Defense

First let me address the question of the security/political meaning of civil defense. Basically this is a question of the nature of threats to us and what sort of defense means we have at our disposal. Unfortunately, this question is frequently--intentionally or unintentionally--forgotten when the problem is discussed.

The Soviet Union has never made a secret of the fact that, for them, their reconcilable contrast between capitalism and socialism has determined their policy. They have never expressed any doubt that this antagonism will only be resolved by a victory of socialism, and that only then could there be peace. This position was emphatically endorsed at the 27th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in February. This global political hegemony claim is opposed by the policy of the NATO states, which is oriented, as embodied in the United Nations Charter, toward maintaining peace.

The armament of both blocs of East and West, NATO and Warsaw Pact, corresponds with their military doctrines for current political objectives. The offensive weaponry of the East, oriented toward expansion, is countered by the armament of the West, oriented toward prevention of war through deterrence. Through production of arms, particularly during the years of western detente policy, the Warsaw Pact developed a military imbalance versus NATO, which according to the most recent study of the commander in chief of NATO has led to a 2:1 ratio in Europe in terms of conventional weapons. The nuclear medium-range systems (i.e., SS-20) and nuclear short-range missiles, which are targeted at Europe, are also characterized by a considerable numerical advantage over the West.

Peace today is based on superior weaponry. As a result of that, the political stability of the world is full of risks. Those who deny political antagonism

between East and West and who consider these policies to be normal, consider as normal the acceptance of the abnormal. In fact, we are dealing with a massive political and military threat to the free world by the Warsaw Pact forces.

This should cause us great concern. With its narrow east-west distance, the Federal Republic of Germany shares a common border with Warsaw Pact lands of over 1000 km. One-third of our population lives in a strip just 100 km west of this border, a strip that also contains one-fourth of our industry. In any military conflict between East and West, there is no doubt that armed encounters would occur at least on our territory near the border. Furthermore, the entire territory of the Federal Republic would be an operational region for NATO, and utilized for troop supply needs. Any kind of warfare in central Europe would involve our country.

#### The Right to Information

We place our hopes in the strategy of avoiding war through deterrence. But what exactly does that mean? Unfortunately, most strategy discussions take place in the abstract. How can the ordinary citizen act on that: The average citizen wants to know how he personally will be affected by a war. And he has the right to this information.

The civilian populace must be told that, should our deterrents fail, they could be affected by a war in the following ways:

1. Through the direct effects of weapons on people and materiel, both from air and from the ground.
2. Through local or widespread failure of supply sources.
3. Through local or widespread collapse of communication and transit connections.
4. Through occupation of a part of our country by enemy forces.
5. Through mass flight.
6. Through local or widespread collapse of public order.

These are events that many of our citizens can still recall from their own experience. I recalled them while speaking of such sorrowful events. Everyone could be affected by the above possible scenarios, and they could endanger the internal stability of the nation.

Civil defense cannot prevent the effects of war occurrences and damages, but it can place limits on these effects. This in fact is a mission that civil defense must concentrate on, throughout the entire country. In our densely populated country there are no absolutely secure sites, should we be compelled

to defend ourselves. Unfortunately, we cannot depend on assuming that the so-called "indefensible sites," as defined by the Amendment Protocol of the Geneva Red Cross Convention, would actually be secure.

Thus on the basis of our current civil defense program, one must fear that many believe that civil defense procedures are included as part of the military deterrent capabilities of NATO defensive forces. This is false. Civil defense is independent of military defense, for it properly belongs to civil protection. And independent measures are required to institute civil defense. Unfortunately, we have never concerned ourselves with the risks involved in the reaction of an unprotected populace during an attack. After all, resistance can only be expected of a citizenry when there is a realistic chance of surviving a war. And I wish to add: defense preparedness can be expected of soldiers only when they know that the ones they are to defend are properly protected.

Unfortunately, it is far too little known that our civilian population is also directly affected in a case of threat and defense action, because the Federal Republic is obligated to support the operational freedom of all NATO forces on our territory. This includes assuming responsibility for supplying civilians and troops essential for defense; maintaining traffic connections and communications or electricity and water supply; and supplying all with necessary vital goods, to cite just a few examples. This has strategic dimensions in the total defense plan and also shows clearly that military defense is impossible without civilian defense.

This also makes clear that the defense capability of NATO in central Europe depends upon the survivability of the civilian population of Germany.

With these relationships understood, who would doubt that civilian protection is a vital part of the strategy of non-war through deterrence. Deterrence is based upon the threat of risk taking. Just how high would an aggressor appraise the risk of attack when dealing with an adversary whose civilian population is insufficiently protected against enemy action and whose armed forces are, as a consequence, only conditionally prepared for defense.

#### Civil Defense: A Humanitarian Task

Civil defense as a means of security policy also arises from understandable humanitarian grounds. It also results from the missions of the Federal Republic of Germany as part of the general defense for maintaining operational freedom on its territory. This is the concrete strategic function and significance of civil defense as a political position by our country. The fulfillment or nonfulfillment of these unavoidable tasks for the defense of our country has an immediate effect on the credibility of deterrence and thus on the effectiveness of the strategy of non-war.

And what is the current outlook for the functional capability of civil defense as a means of policy?

Basic law and federal legislation regulate the military defense of the nation. The army has its firm position within the country. It fulfills its mission of securing peace in the alliance. Military defense is a stable and reliable part of national defense.

Unfortunately one cannot make a similar statement regarding civil defense. It is inadequate. And many among us are unaware that it is also unrenounceable as part of the total national defense and that military defense is not even possible without a viable civil defense program.

The importance of civil defense, which from the viewpoint of the populace is a particularly important component of civil protection, is equally little understood as a means of implementing security politics. Do our citizens actually know that they are constitutionally entitled to civil defense as part of their basic rights to inviolability of life and freedom for injury? It is political neglect to have failed to inform the public that it is threatened and what the nature of this threat is. Thus the public is also aware that protection against this threat must be instituted and that it can be developed. And the public also has no knowledge of the fact that civil defense has not only a humanitarian function for individual safety but also fulfills political and strategically effective functions for maintaining peace. The widespread tabooing of this subject has led regretfully to a situation in which civil protection and civil defense are scarcely understood by a wide segment of the public, and that they may even be regarded with suspicion.

Certainly the Bundestag wished to improve this situation on 4 July 1980, when it gave the government the order to simplify and improve civil defense legislation. I do not wish to go into the process of this legislative action and its details. However, it is certain that fulfilling this legislative mission has been complicated by the fact that to date there is no defined political requirement for civil protection and civil defense for the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### Unsatisfying Civil Defense

We need clear regulations and we need a comprehensive orientation of the public. Who would have doubts about that considering our unsatisfactory civil defense situation? The shortcomings, arising either out of a lack of or, subsequently, insufficient legislation, are legislatively planned shortcomings.

This is also true for the construction of shelters, which is frequently identified with civil defense. Air raid shelters of all types of warfare are the most effective personal protection available. We need not look at examples from other countries to realize this. But anyone advocating, sensibly enough, a stay-put policy, namely to expect of the populace that they stay at home during threat and defensive actions, and those who do not exclude the existing threat against the public from aerial or ground war actions,

should not leave the construction of shelters to individual initiative, particularly in the hands of a public so poorly informed about questions of national defense. They should not do it because of constitutional obligations, nor humanitarian reasons, and also not in view of the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany to maintain the operational freedom of its defense forces.

The suggestion that full protection cannot be provided in any kind of war with appropriate funds is nonsense. Complete protection has never existed. But in a conventional as well as in a nuclear war, a high percentage of the populace can survive if it is protected. One must learn to comprehend that an adversary, determined to attack, will appraise his risks as being reduced if our population is unprotected and susceptible to attack. It is inhumane in the face of the existing dangers to dismiss the necessity of air raid shelter construction. The legislators must learn this fact as well.

Of course the claim that protective shelter construction is expensive is an accurate one. Some are of the opinion that the solution is to reduce the defense budget to procure funds for shelter construction. As if it were as simple as that. Can one really believe that the efficiency of civil defense can be increased by trying to find a cure for the symptoms of its inadequacy, and thus weaken those defense of the country by reducing our military capability?

No, lasting and satisfying solutions to this problem--impairment of the defense capability of the Federal Republic of Germany--can only be achieved when national defense, and that includes civil defense, is understood as a single task and when it is implemented in a unified manner, with all legal and organizational requirements met and in cooperation with the federal and state governments. In no case should civil defense be reduced to an alibi function with a false feeling of security where in reality there is insecurity.

#### Arguments Against Civil Defense

There is resistance against civil defense, based primarily on two arguments:

1. In wartime there is no protection. Any war would lead to a nuclear apocalypse. Wars should be prevented.
2. Civil defense threatens the East, provokes it and thus increases the danger of war.

The first argument is propounded by pacifistic movements of all political colors and those who wish to build another kind of society and simply use pacifist groups toward this end. Discussions with these groups are complicated by the fact that they are identified with leftist movements (and I do not deny the seriousness of these groups' efforts). This becomes more difficult in view of the fact that politicians belong to both groups who carry their opposition views to our parliaments.

It is of little use to understand that defaming civil defense in this way is due to ignorance and perhaps also due to an information deficit and that those who advocate civil defense refusal behave in a rather despicable way. Little progress is also made when we understand that we are dealing with a disinformation campaign conducted by the East. No, the influx of this disinformation can only be countered when factual and more intensive information on civil defense is provided to the public. This is a security and political task of our country.

Fear is also evoked by the second argument. Peace movement activists and believers in different systems maintain that civil defense, especially shelter construction, threaten the East and escalate international tension. Because some peace researchers support the escalation theory, this line of argumentation occasionally appears to have a scientific basis. That such reasoning has its listeners and sometimes is influential is again a result of an information deficit in the security policy of our country, a result of insufficient knowledge about the political oppositions in the world and the military threats facing the West.

#### Nonserious Argumentation

But this line of reasoning is primarily vacuous because no mention is ever made of the comprehensive legislative and organizational measures for civil defense and protection taken in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Already in the early 1960s the Soviet military leadership demanded civil protection and civil defense measures as a means of preparing the populace for a war. They did not talk much around it—they simply said it as it is. The decisive foundation for developing civil defense was laid in 1966 at the 23rd CPSU Party Congress. Today, civil defense and protection are essential military factors in Soviet armed forces. The chief of civil defense has, with the other commanders in chief of the military forces, the position of deputy defense minister and is a member of the Military Council to the Soviet Union.

Similar regulations are found in the other Warsaw Pact countries, also in the German Democratic Republic. Here one can see in which form civil defense procedures are made a subordinate part of offensive political objectives. This type of militarization of the populace can lead to a quite depressing association with "total war," as Ludendorff showed in his 1935 study on the nature of war. Our civil defense opponents have no comments on these events.

Of course, no one in our country would wish to emulate the form and objectives of civil defense methods of the eastern countries. But those who defame our civil defense as tension-escalating and increasing the danger of war must be questioned regarding their source of information and also asked whose interests they represent. As I stated earlier, a refusal to adopt civil defense is a refusal to be humanitarian and, among politicians, really means the disavowal of ethical legislation on their part.

I also add here: this also holds for those, and I also include physicians' groups who have become Nobel laureates, who fail to participate in civil defense tasks related to catastrophic protection. How important such tasks can be was shown to us most horribly on 26 April 1986 in the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl near Kiev.

Efficiency of Civil Defense must be Increased

A closing word:

"Civil Defense from the Military Viewpoint" was the theme of my address. In this brief analysis I have portrayed the humanitarian and the security/political dimensions of civil defense. The immediately effective function of civil defense becomes clear as a medium of maintaining peace oriented policy of our country and in this case regarding the operational capabilities of military defense.

However, it also becomes clear that the efficiency of our civil defense must and can be increased in the interests of both the nation and its citizens. This requires political action, and thus:

1. We must remedy the information deficit of our populace on questions of national security to provide sufficient basis for the execution of humanitarian and security/political missions of civil defense.
2. We must define the mission of civil protection and, in this connection, also civil defense, within the framework of defense as a whole, in order to create a realistic planning perspective for all necessary measures.
3. We must implement civil defense legislation as rapidly as possible in a form satisfying practical contingencies in order to procure complete functional capability of civil defense on a legislative basis.

We must protect ourselves from the criticism of having ignored to learn from our history. Sacrifice is needed to create an effective civil defense in time of peace and to maintain it. Sacrifice is required from the nation and from its citizens. But why is it understandable to everyone that sacrifice is needed in time of war? Why is it not all the more self-explanatory that sacrifices must be made to preserve peace?

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## PRESS COMMENTS ON KOIVISTO'S REMARKS ON NATO SEA BUILDUP

## Concern Over Aircraft Carriers

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 10 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial Roundup]

[Text] A serious crisis between the superpowers can result in the outbreak of a war in northern Europe, and this is why President Mauno Koivisto has reason to express himself carefully, according to political scientist Steve Lindberg, who, in FINSK TIDSKRIFT, analyses stability in the North on the basis of the president's statement. Several newspapers noted the minority communist meeting and commented that the selection of the actress Kristina Halkola was a good public relations move.

## Nordic "Stability"

In FINSK TIDSKRIFT political scientist Steve Lindberg analyses the military political situation in the North on the basis of President Mauno Koivisto's statements to the Paasikivi community 15 October. At the end of the article, Lindberg stresses that the main question is how Finland is to be able to produce a credible air defense both in the east and the west with the present means if one wants to hold fast to previous security policy priorities.

"How to avoid the image in the east that the Finnish air defense cannot credibly ward off cruise missiles, especially when this threat is combined with tactical fighter attacks from aircraft carriers west around Norway?

"The question is connected in the highest degree to what is perhaps the most essential problem for the policy of neutrality: At what stage of a bipolar crisis does defense cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union begin according to the VSB Pact?

"The natural corollary is that NATO considers Finnish air space to be a suitable route for surprise air attacks with cruise missiles and tactical aircraft against targets on Kola and believes that in a war this air space will not be directly defended by Finnish aircraft unless Aviatsia Protivovozdushnoi Oborony, the Soviet air defense, is close at hand.



"It is therefore that I have already previously argued for a necessary strengthening of our air force, a modernization of our fighter aircraft and the procurement of some AWACS aircraft according to the planned Swedish model. This does not mean that the Finnish army is unnecessary and the previous defense arrangement faulty, as critical peace researchers in Finland have claimed. A modernization of the air defense complemented by a land defense that can defend Finland's territorial integrity support each other in the Finland of today and tomorrow.

"Are the most basic security policy solutions established in the North? Even if the answer may be yes on an absolute macroplan, the contents of these solutions have particularly been put in question since the 1960's by external developments.

"An example of how the processes of change penetrate the security solutions of the Nordic countries is found in the most exposed country, Norway. The basis for Norwegian security policy has been a consideration of relief (more like a striving for relief) and deterrence. Norway's present defense minister, Johan Jorgen Holst, says that a third byword, shielding, has been introduced into Norwegian security calculations in the 1980's. The aim of shielding is to shield Norway.

#### Demands Finnish Security 'Rethinking'

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 12 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Defense -- A Signal Outside"]

[Text] A country's defense policy is also a signal it sends to the outside world. If defense capability declines, there can be political consequences.

It is hardly by chance that security policy questions have begun to pop up in debate in Finland. President Koivisto's speech to the Paasikivi community with its stress on naval questions is the best example. In Finland's Swedish sector, both NYA ARGUS and FINSK TIDSKRIFT have presented notable analyses of the security policy situation and of our foreign and defense policy doctrines.

The common denominator in many of these analyses has been the opinion that the situation in the North is more exposed than previously and that it is particularly the situation in the North Atlantic and in the Norwegian Sea that has changed. In a detailed analysis in FINSK TIDSKRIFT Steve Lindberg concludes that the struggle for positions in the North Atlantic have reached a critical stage and that, if a war between the superpowers should break out, the Nordic countries would be drawn directly into it. Such a view may perhaps be considered alarmist, but one notes that Sweden's prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson, in his otherwise optimistic speech in Helsingfors, also shared such thoughts.

In this connection one must also include the speech that the defense force's Captain General Jaakko Valtanen made to one of the Riksdag's defense committee's seminars in September and which he has recently published in a new version in the organization of editorial chiefs. Valtanen's speech cannot be dismissed simply as one of the supporters of increased defense proposals that are made

professionally by the military leadership in all countries, here as well. Its tone was such that one had occasion to pay attention. The speech also contains information on our preparedness and our military doctrine.

One has searched for a more accurate definition of crisis management, which has had a much larger place in military reasoning in recent years. The term has been borrowed from international military doctrine and is obviously well known, but its application to our conditions is still of interest.

The introduction of the concept of crisis management in our doctrine is connected to the changes that the image of the military threat has undergone. The consequences of starting an open war, particularly in Europe, are so frightening that one is tempted -- or forced, if one will -- to look for other methods than the use of force. In the parliamentary defense committee's deliberations in 1976 a passage was introduced that has since been repeated and cited to death. It goes: "A situation in which peace is disturbed but the relations between the parties have not worsened to the point of war is more likely in our part of the world than an open war." The concept of crisis management fits such a "twilight zone."

In his speech General Valtanen defines crisis management as "readiness in our defense organization to have a quick and well thought-out answer to possible threatening situations on a lower level than war." As examples of such situations he mentions "political and military threats, pressure, blockades, demonstrations of military strength, troop movements, intensified intelligence activity, provoking territorial violations, radio jamming, sabotage, and terrorist activity."

One may ask how great the chances are for such a "low profile war" to touch Finland. Up to now the superpowers have carefully refrained from directly provoking one another, and of course the starting point for our military doctrine is that only a superpower conflict can constitute a danger for northern Europe. But historical experience shows that situations can arise that are on the balance between war and peace. Such a situation existed at the end of the 1930's, and during the years when Berlin was the focal point of observation, one could speak of peace being threatened in spite of the fact that one was still a long way from war.

Readiness in the face of possible new forms of warfare demand greater changes in traditional thought and the ability to make more flexible countermoves than we have been accustomed to up to now. A large number of the measures hardly rest on the defense forces, but on the police, various information organs, etc. But if the threat to the country takes on such a character that the defense forces are also used, it is primarily the air force and the navy that must have the capacity to meet surprise attacks. In the ground forces, the emphasis is not on mass effect but on the possibility of using highly mobile and well-equipped units. Flexible leadership and frictionless connections with the political powers are perhaps the most important of all.

It is clear that General Valtanen is not only thinking of crisis management, but also of defense's traditional role of repulsing an attack on the country. Here above all the armament for the army comes into difficulty, as the third parliamentary defense committee had in mind. Under the former defense committee, the air force stood foremost, so that at times more than half of the defense budget went for its needs. This was also a correct setting of priorities with the idea that Finland's air space is what is first affected by an outbreak of war, even perhaps during a period of tension without war.

In the meantime, the idea was that the needs of the ground forces should be considered in the 1980's more than before. The reason for this was, among other things, the recommendation of the third parliamentary committee to supply half of the reserves, 250,000 men, with up-to-date equipment. This must be regarded as a very modest goal that actually leaves the other half of the reserves as a sort of poorly armed home guard.

Among other things because of the strong rise in the prices of war material, the parliamentary committee's timetable for the restoration of the army could not be upheld. The figures from Valtanen's speech show that this is not really an armament in the real sense. A third of our defense material can be regarded as up-to-date, another third comes from WWII and from the time before the war.

One problem is that the air force will soon demand renewals that will collide with the needs of the land forces. General Valtanen specifically named the gaps in Lapland's weak air defense as a defect. There is a question about the defensive missiles that the third defense committee has already discussed.

At the end of his speech, Valtanen said something that aroused a good bit of attention: If the situation concerning the question of the defense appropriation is not improved, the defense forces may be allowed to reevaluate their mission. From the context it appears that he comes close to questioning general military service if the army cannot be properly equipped.

In a world armed to the teeth, a country's defense policy is a signal it sends to the outer world. In Finland's case it signals the country's will to maintain its independence and fulfill its agreements. If a declining defense capacity should cause the Soviet Union to draw the conclusion that Finland cannot fulfill its commitments, or cause NATO to regard Finland as a military vacuum, it cannot help having political consequences. This means that it is well justified to continue the moderate increase in the defense level that characterized the time of the defense committee.

9124

CSO: 3650/32

## ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF URGES VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT OF WOMEN

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Dec '86 p 3

[Text] The armed forces chief of staff, Vice Admiral Jan Klenberg, has proposed voluntary defense training for women starting in the next decade. He thinks that between 30,000 and 40,000 women should be trained so that they can perform duties during a time of crisis. Klenberg made his proposal Sunday in an interview with the Tammerfors newspaper, AAMULEHTI, which at the same time published a poll according to which a good half of the Finns support the idea of voluntary military service for women.

Noncombat tasks that Klenberg thinks women should perform during a possible crisis are, among other things, care of the sick, communications work, and territorial supervision.

According to the poll, 56 percent of the Finns agree that women should carry out voluntary military service if they can be assigned proper tasks. On the other hand, almost forty percent of those interviewed were completely negative on military service for women.

At the same time, 56 percent of those interviewed think that the present system, which requires women to take part in the country's defense closely within the shelter of the population, is good. A third of those interviewed want the tasks to be expanded, while 12 percent want to free women from all tasks in connection with the country's defense forces.

In the poll 970 adult Finns were interviewed.

9124

CSO: 3650/31

## CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO DRAFT REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 14 Dec 86 p 7

[Text] An alternative defense doctrine for Finland in the 1990's will be worked out by a citizens' committee with representatives from the Center and Liberal parties. Legislative Councillor Lars Dufholm (Swedish People's Party) is the spokesman.

The group will analyse Finland's security policy situation and the role of the armed forces with special consideration of the new strategic constellation in northern Europe and developments in weapons technology.

The initiative for the investigation was taken by the Hundras Committee. The group consists of 15 well-known representatives from the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Peoples Democrats, the Communists, and center parties.

"The idea is to examine without prejudice Finland's security policy alignment and to seek a peaceful solution to international problems. The Hundras Committee will also discuss factors that threaten Finland's security and social values.

The members are Lecturer Esko Antola, Editor Heidi Hautala (Greens), Chief Editor Jorma Hentila (Peoples Democrats), Professor Toivo Holopainen, Riksdag Delegate Liisa Jaakonsaari (Social Democrat), Special Researcher Pertti Joenniemi (Social Democrat), Doctor Mikko Juva (Liberal), Appeal Court Justice Paavo Nikula (Green), Chairman Riitta Prusti (Social Democrat), Business Leader Folke Sundman (Social Democrat), Labor Leader Helja Tammissola (Peoples Democrat), Chairman Timo Toropainen, Construction Advisor Seppo Westerlund (Social Democrat) and Professor Reijo Wilenius (Center).

9124

CSO: 3650/31

## NOKIA, VALMET TO JOIN IN WEAPONS PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 16 Dec 86 p 16

[Article by P. Winckelmann-Zilliacus]

[Text] "It is hard to say whether the merger of Nokia's and Valmet's weapons production comes too late. But it is good that the idea has now been introduced," Jaakko Tarkka, director of Nokia's weapons production, said. He says that competition in international weapons production is hard and that it is unwise to have two competing domestic firms in this branch.

Yesterday it became clear that Nokia and Valmet would merge their weapons production. They have discussed a partnership that will produce weapons for sport and hunting as well as defense material. Nokia and Valmet will have equal shares in the company.

The company's goal is to found an economically profitable, internationally competitive and efficient company. The company will effectively plan, produce, and market its wares, they say.

200 Million

Director Jaakko Tarkka does not want to say what the sales in Nokia's weapons production are. "It is a business secret. But the new company will have a turnover of 200 million marks. Nokia's share of the turnover is somewhat larger than Valmet's. The number of personnel in the merged company is between 900 and 1,000. At present there are 450 persons employed in Nokia's weapons production, according to Tarkka.

Since the marketing will be more efficient, does this mean there will be large reductions?

"It is too early to say. One can also imagine that at least everyone here at home will be needed in the business. But the number of retailers abroad will be reduced."

"Nokia and Valmet sell weapons to the same countries, and this means that we have the same sales contacts," Tarkka said.

## Economic Competition

Valmet and Nokia have competed with each other in the production of rifles and shotguns. Both companies have also produced the same products for the defense forces.

Nokia's weapons production has been unprofitable for some time. Overcapacity is great in the world's weapons production, and price competition is therefore hard. Nokia exports weapons to North America, Scandinavia, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

The new company plans to begin its activity just after the new year. Valmet's and Nokia's weapons personnel will be transferred to the new company as so-called old workers.

9124

CSO: 3650/31

## NAVY, COAST GUARD, HOME GUARD IMPROVE ASW CAPABILITIES

## Navy's Coastal Corvettes Operational

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish No. 11 86 pp 7-9

[Text] The fleet has this year received its first two coastal corvettes -- HMS Stockholm and HMS Malmo -- and received its first trained crews. The vessel has primarily been used in antisubmarine warfare, but it has also been tried in many other naval tasks. Experience with the new vessel type has been consistently very positive.

It is well known that foreign powers carry on extensive underwater operations against our country. This includes all the coasts and can at the same time involve many different operations. These operations certainly have many purposes, but primarily they are probably exercises in landing sabotage groups that can act rapidly with surprise to knock out important total defense installations. In this way our mobilization could be made even more difficult and delayed, and important conditions for conscript mobilization could be upset. These operations are therefore direct threats to our invasion defense.

Foreign military operations against our country have serious consequences for our security policy. We must therefore show even in peacetime that we have the ability to resist systematic intrusions. Only in this way can we achieve trust and respect for our ability in war. We must also do this to maintain the relative stability of the security policy of northern Europe.

## Submarine Chaser Force -- Nucleus of Submarine Defense

The basis of antisubmarine warfare must consist of a respect-inspiring operational force. When foreign subs are known or feared to be operating within our territorial waters, effective resources must be concentrated to combat them. The foreign subs must experience such a threat to their operations that they refrain from exercises in Swedish waters. To achieve this we must use both active and passive systems and create possibilities for necessary interaction between them.

Submarines and hydrophone buoys are examples of passive -- but mobile -- reconnaissance systems. They can detect subs at great distances. But their



effectiveness is reduced if the foreign subs use a silent tactic, that is, go at such a slow speed that they give off a minimum of noise. Such subs can best be detected with active hydrophones. For this both vessels and helicopters are necessary, because they can complement each other. The vessel can observe large sea areas over a long period time, and the helicopter can be put into operation rapidly and with surprise.

Active reconnaissance vessels, passive reconnaissance subs, and helicopters form therefore the three cornerstones around which antisubmarine warfare is built up.

#### Key Role in Our Naval Defense

Coastal corvettes form the basis of our fleet's active vessel system. All experience up to now shows that these vessels are well suited for their task. From an international perspective it may appear a bit sensational that an effective submarine defense can be built up around such a small missile vessel as the Stockholm class. The vessel is only 50 meters long, but in spite of this it has eight long range sea target missiles, a number of torpedos, and special submarine depth charges. It has good minelaying capacity, as well as two effective air defense systems with, among other things, a significant target deception capacity.

The navy is now building farther upon the positive results it has achieved. Another four coastal corvettes are under construction at the Karlskron shipyard. Within five years our first "modern" sub-chasing unit can be organized. It will consist of five to six coastal corvettes, subs with new hydrophone systems, together with modernized heavy helicopters. The force will also include patrol boats with new hydrophones, mine-sweeping vessels for searching the sea floor, and aircraft with special antisubmarine equipment.

At present there are in the fleet surface vessels, submarines, and helicopters to partially organize a further force. Unfortunately funds are lacking to rapidly equip these units with modern reconnaissance equipment. Funds are also lacking to build the necessary coastal corvettes for the other force.

#### Important Defense Decision

Naval personnel have worked for many years to improve their knowledge of antisubmarine warfare, to train new operators and technicians, and to develop new tactics and techniques. The efforts have been made with the unswerving conviction that one is on the right path to finally put a stop to the submarine intrusions. But the concrete decision on a strengthening of antisubmarine warfare is considered insufficient, and one is also seeking working regulations that fit the changed situation for sea-going personnel.

The coming defense decision will therefore be decisive for the continued development of submarine defense. A further strengthening is necessary. The first force must be speeded up. A decision must also be made on the other force. The main concern is funds for more coastal corvettes.

Interview with Commander Sten Hecker of the HMS Stockholm

UNDER SVENSK FLAGG (USF): The Stockholm, with her 330 tons, is the world's smallest sub-chasing corvette. Is she too small?

Hecker: We had occasion last fall to test her in the southern Baltic in very bad weather with waves up to 4.5 meters. We could maintain effectively -- both as far as personnel and equipment were concerned -- a cruising speed of 18 knots against the sea. This says a lot!

USF: How large is the crew?

Hecker: Thirty-two men, of whom about half are conscripts.

USF: The new vessels are very complicated technically, not the least in telecommunications. Do you manage to train the conscripts, who of course often sit in key positions?

Hecker: Yes, it goes very well. To some extent we handpick youths with civilian technical training behind them, and in some cases many of them perform a few more months conscript time. Most important of all, however, is that the young men who serve on corvettes are highly motivated. I think this is because the antisubmarine warfare we carry out against foreign intruders gives the service both a realistic and a more serious stamp. The navy chief has also recently proposed a change in service that will allow a longer time for naval duty, and this will improve the situation even more.

USF: Is it crowded on board?

Hecker: The accommodations are both spacious and pleasant, but measured by civilian standards of course it is crowded. Take for example the mess where we eat, among other things. On the other hand, the command center and the machine room are fine. But there are naturally areas on board where one has to be something of an acrobat to operate in.

USF: You have received new cannon and modern, Swedish-produced, fire control and command post equipment. What has this meant for the vessel's total effectiveness?

Hecker: The automated and computerized equipment means not only increased accuracy, speed, and capacity, it also provides the possibility of maintaining the vessel fully combat ready with half the crew. This is important, for example, under extended antisubmarine operations.

USF: Do you miss a cannon larger than the 57 mm on board?

Hecker: No, not as far as air defense is concerned, which is very effective. In combat with surface forces we have of course missiles with a range of more than 70 kilometers. And the 57 mm is not as small as one thinks. It hits even

at a distance of ten kilometers, and it has a firing speed of over 200 rounds per minute. There are also possibilities here of increasing the range with new types of ammunition.

USF: You said before that the corvettes could maintain continued combat effectiveness with only half the crew, which gives better staying power. But is this necessary? The gas turbines have great strength and therefore provide for high speed. But they literally "drink" fuel.

Hecker: True, but we only use the gas turbines for top speed. Normally we cruise with two fuel saving diesels. They give us great staying power. I forgot to say that we also make our own water on board. And every seaman knows that previously the water supply was a problem, particularly on smaller vessels.

USF: One last question. What is the procedure nowadays, for example, when an important convoy is to be protected by, among other things, coastal corvettes. Are the best escort vessels deployed before the convoy and the rest around the protected area?

Hecker: Yes, in principle, but an important new factor has appeared -- the helicopter -- which of course searches for submarines with its hydrophone and for enemy overwater aircraft with its radar. One therefore deploys the highly mobile helicopters in front of the convoy. Then come the coastal corvettes, which have three missions, namely to discover and combat submarines, to defend the convoy against attacking surface units with their sea missiles, and to be responsible for air defense in the "following wind section."

The patrol boats are formed along the "flanks" and are responsible there primarily for air defense but are prepared to use their sea target missiles against attacking surface vessels and to go on the attack against discovered submarines. In the latter case, the rule is that the unit -- helicopter or vessel -- that first makes contact with a sub directs the operations of the others. In conclusion it must be said that the antiaircraft artillery on the coastal corvettes, missile boats, and patrol boats is so accurate that it can even be used to shoot down oncoming missiles.

#### Coast Guard Modernizing, Reorganizing

Stockholm UNDER SVENSK FLAGG in Swedish No. 11 86 pp 12-19, 21

[Article by Sven Uhler: "Coast Guard Modern and Effective"]

[Text] In its modern form the Coast Guard is known by the majority of those who in one way or another live and work at sea or along the coast. The Coast Guard is a part of the Customs Office and has entered into the latter's guard organization. It will be interesting to show the buildup of the Coast Guard on the occasion of the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Customs Office.

The Customs Office celebrated its 350th anniversary in September 1986 because in 1636 a more systematized customs procedure was created by the addition of

a general customs administrator and the passage of special customs legislation. Sweden's position as a large power in the Baltic Sea area demanded among other things increased government income, and one of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's suggestions to strengthen the state treasury was to collect customs payments on goods crossing the country's boundaries.

In order to prevent the goods getting through without being taxed -- an operation that is more popularly called smuggling -- and which one had to think about even in the 1600's -- a procedure was established by which only certain places had the right to deal in foreign trade -- staple towns -- and by which the taxing should be accomplished as soon as possible on the way to these towns to reduce the necessity for an escort. For staple towns with open coasts this was no problem, but in archipelago areas one had to establish special entry areas, for example, for Stockholm it was Dalar island.

Shore Knights -- the Coast Guard of the 1600's

Even if this system had theoretical advantages from the supervisory point of view, one soon found out that it could not effectively prevent smuggling, and between the years 1638-40 the first elements of what was later to become the Coast Guard appeared -- shore knights were stationed to guard the area around Kalmar, and a small, armed sail schooner was taken from the fleet to guard the area around Dalar Island. The birth of the Coast Guard can therefore be placed at 1638 at the earliest. Before this time some customs supervisory operations were summarily performed by the Navy.

After a while the demand for guarding the coast increased and the job was divided functionally into operations on land and at sea. In the 1680's there were about 35 shore knights who patrolled on horseback and about 15 vessels (customs warships) that patrolled the coasts and whose crews consisted of a ship's lieutenant and boatmen.

In the 1700's and 1800's the organization underwent few changes. Because of great fluctuations in the sole mission -- customs supervision and the prevention of smuggling -- the function was at times almost abolished. The leadership of the operation was completely in the hands of local customs administrators, and operations at sea were often complete failures because of poor equipment and bad seamanship.

With the establishment of a central customs administration -- General Customs Council -- in 1825, the special job of Coast Guard Inspector was created for advice on the acquisition of equipment and the recruiting of crews, but not on Coast Guard operations.

As a rule, the shore knights and the ship crews operated alone and quite independently. At the beginning of the 1800's, a decline in the organization could be noted, mainly because of incompetent leadership and bad equipment. To find a remedy for this, sections of the Coast Guard were reorganized in 1835 into districts under special coastal commanders. The whole organization was

placed under military law, and military titles were introduced. But the organization remained under the Customs Office as a civilian, uniformed guard branch. The step was taken primarily to establish discipline, loyalty, order, and method in the operation.

#### Civilian Regulations

At the end of the 1800's, one felt the goal had been achieved, and in 1904 there was a return to civilian regulations. At the same time one had, particularly in Scania, noticed the advantage of independently operating Coast Guard commanders with responsibility for large areas. In this way special commanders were named for Scania, Blekinge, Halland, Gothenburg, and Bohus counties, but for the east coast and Norrland the Customs Office for reasons of economy continued to direct Coast Guard operations.

In the beginning of the 1900's communications and industry grew. This naturally had an effect on the Customs Office, particularly the Coast Guard, which gained access to motorboats, cars, and after a while radio communications, even though they were primitive. In 1923 the Customs Office was reorganized into customs districts, and in connection with the analysis the activities of the Coast Guard were discussed with great interest.

#### Increased Independence

As a result of certain attempts to reduce the number from about 400 men by half by transferring some tasks to other guard branches in the Customs Office and to fire and pilot departments, the opposition became so strong that a special working group (coast guard experts) was appointed by the government in 1920. The result of the working group's deliberations was that the Coast Guard should retain its former tasks and that at the same time its independence within the Customs Office should be strengthened by a special district division for the Coast Guard.

In the 1930's, particularly in consideration of the increasing smuggling of alcohol over the sea, one saw the necessity for the operations of the Coast Guard to stretch over large areas along the coast and out to sea. In 1937 the prerequisites for the modern Coast Guard were established with a special job of Chief of the Coast Guard within the general Customs Office leadership and the establishment of four regional coastal districts under the leadership of a coastal district commander.

#### Rented and Borrowed Vessels

The sea guarding vessels that operated in the Baltic Sea all through the 1930's consisted of rented civilian vessels and borrowed torpedo and picket-boats from the fleet. The vessels were placed directly under the Coast Guard commander. This system operated until the outbreak of war in 1939. During the war the Coast Guard was used for special guard tasks and for receiving refugees. After the war smuggling declined drastically, and the General Customs Council carried out a successive reduction of personnel with the idea of completely disbanding the Coast Guard ( 1930 - 550 men, 1939 - 440, and 1945 - 390). The country's

new for hunting and fishing supervision, as well as a certain amount of sea traffic control, led to a certain upswing for the organization, but the personnel unanimously wanted a transfer to the police.

#### A Far-Sighted Border Commander

In the General Customs Council after the war the Coast Guard and the Border Guard (Customs with Finland and Norway) were brought together under one commander, the border commander. It had been the custom to select the Coast Guard commander from suitable naval officers. Commander Roland Engdahl was named border commander. For a brief period he was able to convince both the operational leaders and the government authorities of the need for a Coast Guard role in the future alongside the traditional customs tasks.

Under Engdahl's far-sighted leadership a modernization and strengthening of the Coast Guard was begun, both in personnel and equipment. Another reason for this was that the responsibility for rescue work involving oil and chemical spills was given to the Coast Guard.

For executive, supervisory, and control functions -- together with the customs missions -- the Coast Guard personnel needed increased police authority. A special committee was appointed to study the tasks and the question of authority. The committee found (end of the 1960's) that the best solution was an independent Coast Guard entrusted with the authority necessary to accomplish its mission. But the directive did not provide a place for this, and the idea was dropped. But this was the beginning of a long debate on the proper organizational position of the Coast Guard that has still not been settled.

The Coast Guard's position within the Customs Office led in 1974 to a strong integration into the new regional customs organization. The coastal districts and their commanders were eliminated and the independence of the Coast Guard was considerably diminished. Internal conflicts and problems came at the same time, as the work was greatly increased by extended territorial waters and the establishment of the Swedish fishing zone.

#### Its Own Air Operation

In 1977 the Coast Guard gained a permanent air operation with aircraft at the same time that a special committee was appointed to study the division of responsibility between various authorities for supervision of the seas. Because of bad directives, no rational solution was suggested, but there was a meeting of the Coast Guard and Navy regional leadership and liaison organizations in Malmo, and a strengthening of the Coast Guard's police authority was put through.

Another committee -- environmental safety sea transport -- suggested according to the model of the American Coast Guard a corresponding Swedish model by means of the combination of the Coast Guard and the Shipping Department into a new government sea authority with complete responsibility for all civilian guarding, control, security, service, and rescue operations at sea and along the coasts.

During the continued study the Coast Guard personnel, the General Customs Council, the national police leadership, and the supreme commander were able to achieve the feat of sliding from a positive position to a strongly negative one. The merger was supposed -- if it was successful in practice, which many doubted -- to bring about increased effectiveness, better use of resources, and savings. Because of the government's decision in May of this year no merger was carried out; the Shipping Department carried out its reorganization according to previous plans, while the Coast Guard's organization for the present is administered within the Finance Department in the light of available research material.

#### The Coast Guard of Today

Today the Coast Guard is a modern, operational, sea professional organization, still belonging to the Customs Office. Besides its customs duties, it fulfills many community and government tasks in the areas of civilian supervision and control, rescue service, and certain duties along the coast, in the territorial waters, in the fishing zone including Lake Malaren and Lake Vanern. The Coast Guard works all year round in the above areas and is totally responsible for operations necessary to limit the harmful effects of slippages of oil or chemicals from vessels into the sea.

#### Supervision and Control

General border supervision

Customs supervision

Supervision of protected areas

Supervision of hunting and fishing and environmental protection in the coastal zone

Supervision of deep sea fishing

Supervision of sea traffic

Supervision of the ocean floor

Other supervision

#### Rescue Service

Sea and air rescue

Transportation of the sick

Environmental protection at sea against

- oil slippages

- chemical slippages

- radioactive fallout

#### Other

Oceanographic measurements

Transportation assistance among other things of other authorities

During a state of readiness and war the Coast Guard is transferred completely to the Navy to carry out special tasks (observation, shipping control, simple mining, etc.).

## Increased Operational Independence

Against the threat of the Coast Guard being assigned too many duties besides its main one in customs, the General Customs Council has in accordance with the organization of 1974 increased the Coast Guard's operational independence by changes both on the central and the regional levels. In the General Customs Council the commander of the Coast Guard (formerly the border commander) is responsible for Coast Guard operations. The staff organization is designated as the Coast Guard Office and contains the chancellery, the operational section, and the ship and communications section. The duties are of a policy making, planning, instructing, and advising character, but the Coast Guard commander with his staff (Coast Guard leadership) can if necessary (large or more complicated operations) directly lead the necessary operations from the headquarters in Stockholm.

## Four Coastal Districts

On the regional level the four coastal districts (north, east, south, and west) have been reintroduced, while the coastal district commanders become part of the regional customs offices and are placed directly under the respective customs directors. The staff organization consists of a Coast Guard office divided into an operative and a technical section. Coastal district commanders and staffs are located in Sundsvall, Stockholm, Malmo (placed together with the commander of the Malmo naval supervisory area) as well as Gothenburg, and they are responsible for operational direction of activities in the district. The geographical composition of the coastal districts agrees in principle with the military division. Each coastal district is divided into a Coast Guard area that corresponds approximately to the respective coastal county.

For communication and direction the Coast Guard has a well constructed communications net with communications centers and linking stations. The radio equipment includes all the present frequencies for sea traffic in short wave, long wave, and VHF bands, including air traffic frequencies. All communications centers have terminal connection with the fishing directorate's computerized fishing quota register. In Malmo and Stockholm there are command centers that are always manned, while corresponding ones in Sundsvall and Gothenburg operate only during office hours; during nonoffice hours there are duty officers at home. For both the northern and western coastal districts an expansion is planned into constantly manned regional command centers.

The Coast Guard's seagoing vessels include about 130 ships and boats of mainly the following types:

- Coast Guard vessels for guarding the sea and coastal waters,
- Coast Guard boats (racing boats, rubber boats, and ice boats) for guarding archipelagoes,
- environmental protection vessels and working boats for dealing with oil and chemicals.



For sea and coastal supervision from the air the Coast Guard has aircraft equipped with remote analysis equipment based at Bromma, Sturup, and Sæve. The pilots are recruited from the Coast Guard Corps and must have had some sea duty before pilot training begins.

In addition there are 60 vehicles -- guard vehicles, smaller trucks and buses, as well as snow scooters for transportation and rescue operations.

In the Coast Guard's organization ready to prevent or limit the damage from the slippage of oil or chemicals there are among other things some 30 bases connected on the coast and equipment with a supply of pumps, removal equipment, and chemical protection equipment among other things.

The total number of Coast Guard personnel reaches about 600 persons. The main part is recruited from the archipelago population, from merchant or fishing ships or from the Navy and receive their Coast Guard training in general and special courses. About 10 percent of them are trained as salvage divers.

The activities of the Coast Guard have the character of "continual operations." Flexible working time is planned so that in each region there are always units on duty. The patrols have scheduled missions in one or more of the Coast Guard working areas. If necessary, guard vessels can be redirected to unforeseen missions of higher priority, for example sea rescue or dealing with oil.

#### Flexible Organization

The Swedish Coast Guard is known to be a flexible and nonbureaucratic organization. Small staffs, rapid decision making, and technically advanced equipment contribute to this flexibility. The rapidly growing national interest creates on the other hand problems for the Coast Guard. Among them can be mentioned the difficulty of making local politicians understand the expansion of regional command organizations at the cost of the reduction of local liaison centers and at the same time a strengthening of patrol operations, the need for the exchange of obsolete vessels (the oldest guard vessel is 53 years old), the strengthening of supporting technology and maintenance, economy, personnel administration, and sea and international law.

A basic thought in the philosophy of Coast Guard operations is the continued improvement in the use of personnel and equipment for various purposes without neglecting any task. In the guard area this is best done in cooperation with the Navy and the police. In the area of service and rescue operations experiments are being made with, for example, ice reconnaissance with flights to icebreakers, observation duty to SMHI, and the use of environmental protection vessels in passage through shipping channels. Another interesting area that is just now being investigated is the possibility of using ocean-going guard ships for both ocean fishing observation and for support vessels for Swedish ocean fishing.

The strength of the Swedish Coast Guard is that it is a civilian, professional, sea-oriented authority that with the same basic resources in the form of personnel and equipment can solve many problems in guarding, rescue, and

and service duties at sea. Because of this, the Coast Guard works with various departments such as Finance (the head), Defense (rescue service), Agriculture (hunting, fishing, environment), Foreign Office (international law).

The prerequisite for this effective and economically satisfying arrangement is that the Coast Guard in the future as well, no matter what its organizational form, can retain its operational independence and can strengthen its administrative, technical, and economic functions.

Internationally the Swedish Coast Guard has attracted much attention and thanks for its manifold nature and its system of combatting oil and chemical spills. Of course the international trend toward increased interest in coasts and sea and the need for coast guard activity have also contributed to this. In many countries the fleet has often performed this duty, but because of the extent and civilian character of the duty, more and more countries are abandoning this solution.

#### Two Lines of Development

In principle one can distinguish two lines of development, the so-called sector model in which each authority exercises its powers with its own vessels and aircraft (customs, border control, fishing, police, etc.) or the unified model in which several different functions are carried out by an independent organization with responsibility for all the functions.

The unified model, which internationally usually goes under the name of Coast Guard, is found represented foremost in the U.S., Japan, and Canada, and now India and Holland are considering the introduction of a corresponding model.

The Swedish Coast Guard, which can to a great extent be regarded as a unified model, is nevertheless unique in that it is part of a sector authority (Customs Office). In spite of this, it is included flatteringly enough among the more well-known Coast Guard organizations, and many countries have asked for help from the Swedish Coast Guard after seeing the advantages of the so-called unified model. Unfortunately the Coast Guard, because of a lack of resources, only been able to cooperate on a modest scale, which is too bad when one thinks of the international assistance operations and the chances for Swedish exports in this connection.

#### Home Guard Adds Role

Stockholm MARIN NYTT in Swedish No 5 86 p 2

Article by Tord Nyberg, commander of the 1st Archipelago Company: "Training of Naval Home Guard Units"]

[Text] The coming into existence of a home guard with naval tasks has created a partially new training requirement. The naval home guard units are seaborne

and this presents special demands both in recruiting of personnel and the arrangements for personnel training.

In the fall of 1984 the training of a home guard with naval duties was begun with two boat units organized into a naval home guard unit. Today, two years later, there is an archipelago company that is almost completely recruited, and another archipelago company is being formed.

The archipelago company is a coup defense unit similar to the other home guard units. The tasks the unit must accomplish are among other things:

- Sea supervision
- Manning and defending permanent bases
- Action according to Identification friend or foe (IFF)

The mission requires the unit not only to defend bases but also to operate them -- this requires a mobilization. A valuable addition to the coup organization.

This means that the required training considerably exceeds what is usual in an ordinary home guard situation.

During the training year 1985/86, 7,200 hours of instruction were given. On the average, this means about 50 hours per man.

The training is arranged in four steps. All personnel go through a basic training of 20 hours. This includes orientation, firing of weapons, sentry duty, IFF training, and tactics in the archipelago area. Basic training ends with a visit to the ocean guarding center.

At least once a year we carry out a unit exercise. We train in our unit location in the archipelago for a day and a half. We live like hunters -- haversack rations that we prepare ourselves. It can be hard, as during the last exercise when the wind was blowing 15 to 20 meters a second in the bay and we had to go out in the boat in the dark. In such a situation it is good to have people who grew up in the archipelago and who know the depths and the rocks!

If you have a naval background or like the archipelago -- go to see the military authorities! You will get a pleasant and stimulating duty in a happy and tough gang. You will also help to "keep things clean" in our archipelago while you are making a fine contribution to voluntary defense.

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CSO: 3650/29

## 'TRIDENT' TESTS ARMY, CIVIL RESPONSE TO AIRBORNE INTRUSION

## Complex Interaction of Components

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Jan 87 pp 4-8

[Article by Lt Col Reto Voneschen, St Gallen: "3-20 November 1986: Total Defense Exercise 'TRIDENT'; Some 40,000 Women and Men in Realistic Deployment"]

[Text] For about 3 weeks between 3-20 November last year, the total defense exercise "TRIDENT" of the 4th Field Army Corps in Eastern Switzerland kept some 40,000 participants on the move. In addition to the traditional military exercise, "TRIDENT"--one of the largest exercises of this type in the history of Switzerland--provided various innovations. On the one hand, the entire total defense exercise--into which all five strategic situations were structured--was constructed according to a type of building-block system; on the other hand, and within a very comprehensive framework, cooperation and collaboration of the army with civilian staffs and organizations of the broadest variety of levels were practiced. The two exercise directors, Corps Commander Josef Feldmann (overall direction) and cantonal government member Ernst Rueesch (direction of civilian elements), demonstrated their overall satisfaction with the performance of the army and civil defense units which participated in the exercise.

The 4th Field Army's fall maneuvers last year were, as is known, not designated as a military exercise but as a total defense exercise. As Corps Commander Josef Feldmann explained, this was done to emphasize that--reflecting the realities of modern warfare--the exercise's goal with relation to the training of military units had to be based upon military operations using combined weapons. For this reason, there were deployed in "TRIDENT" both staffs and troops of the territorial organization, as well as civilian defense agencies.

This cooperation in larger military exercises is, however, nothing new; civil defense organizations already participated in larger numbers in "Nutcracker" and "Tank Hunt"--the earlier 4th Field Army Corps exercises. However, in contrast to the earlier exercises, the entire total defense concept was more or less organically incorporated this time as a co-equal element of the maneuver process.

## Exercise Based Upon "Building-Block System"

The "TRIDENT" exercise was composed of five phases. The beginning occurred in response to the normal strategic situation; the situation then intensified into a crisis; it finally flowed into the case of protection of neutrality, and ultimately into the case of national defense. The case of disaster ran parallel to the usual strategic situations.

Through the fact that all strategic situations could also be acted out in "TRIDENT," only those military elements and civilian defense organizations were always called up which were needed in direct response to the degree of threat presented by the situation. Each group which newly entered the exercise had a mission to carry out, within the framework of the assumed situation's degree of threat--each maneuver participant was thus continuously challenged.

The following elements entered into the total defense exercise in sequence: 6th Field Division, most of the 4th Territorial Zone, 6th Border Brigade, air force elements, one AA regiment, most of the 11th Mechanized Division, as well as the civil command and control organizations and the defense organizations of Schaffhausen canton and of the northern portion of Zurich canton.

### 6th Field Division Enters Refresher Course in Standby Alert Role

On 3 November 1986 the 6th Field Division entered the 1986 refresher course as a standby alert unit. The division moved from its assigned mobilization points into its maneuver areas--which, broadly scattered, reached from Jura into the Bern highlands, into Central Switzerland, and even into the Graubunden canton. The division had to maintain a degree of readiness based upon the degree of threat. The training missions lay mainly in the areas of "service in protection of neutrality," "guard duty," and "camouflage."

In the maneuver area, one assumed that international tension had increased and, in response, the main staff elements of the Army, of the 4th Field Army Corps, and of the Territorial Zone had moved in. In the second phase, elements of the 4th Territorial Zone moved in on 10 November and began to build a logistical support system for the troop elements which would move in later. This was a question of ensuring logistical support for some 40,000 persons and about 10,000 vehicles (including tanks, self-propelled guns, and self-propelled howitzers). In addition, various field medical service facilities were made ready.

As of 10 November, those responsible for civil defense in Schaffhausen canton took certain precautions related to the anticipated crisis situation.

### Elements of 6th Field Division Ensure Protection of Neutrality

In the third phase, as of 13 November the 6th Border Brigade was called up within the framework of a partial mobilization. The brigade, which is supposed to act as a covering unit in any case of subsequent war mobilization

of the 4th Field Army Corps, began immediately to occupy its positions and to strengthen them. Special attention was given to demolition targets on the Rhine River.

In this phase, elements of the 6th Field Division, in cooperation with the Border Guard Corps, guaranteed protection of neutrality.

In the area of civil defense, the civil command and control organizations of Schaffhausen canton and its civil defense began their duties on 13 November. With the help of the territorial service, field medical service troops, and air defense troops--shelters were built, protected hospitals were prepared, and cultural treasures were evacuated. In parallel with this, the civil defense organization of the northern portion of Zurich canton began active preparations for possible callups.

Acts of sabotage, accidents, but also the entry of "refugees," "saboteurs," and "military persons" during the second weekend of "TRIDENT" caused serious problems for both civil defense personnel and those units assigned to the protection of neutrality. Among other things, during the night from Friday to Saturday, they practiced the operation of a border-crossing traffic control point at Thayngen (the FRG railroads made a spare train available for this purpose). They were able to demonstrate cooperation between civilian organizations and the army through the example of several cases of damage and of one (simulated) train derailment near Herblingen.

The "Evil Enemy" (Swiss dialect: "Devil"--Ed.) Came by Train

The next phase of the exercise began during the night of 16-17 November. On Sunday evening, the 6th Field Division began moving by train out of its maneuver areas into Schaffhausen canton, and into the Ramser Zipfel, as well as toward the Untersee. Vehicles, equipment, and soldiers were loaded at various stations onto a total of about 80 special trains and then carried into the standby alert areas north of the Rhine River. Within the framework of this spectacular action, they used, among other things, train combinations of the "rolling road" which normally travel between Loetschberg and Simplon. Between Kloten and Schaffhausen and between Effretikon and Neuhausen, they set up for part of the army a rolling highway, which was traveled through the entire night according to a plan calling for a fixed tempo of movement. Logistical support for the rail-transported units was maintained through use of a special supply train, a rolling basic supply point.

As of 0400 hours on Monday, the 6th Field Division played the role of an attacking division of the "Red" maneuver group, which had the mission of moving from Schaffhausen across the Rhine River, pushing forward in the direction of Thur, and keeping the attack axes open for the following echelon units coming behind them.

Mobilization With Airborne Regiment at Back


On Monday morning, the 11th Mechanized Division mobilized within the framework of a simulated general war mobilization. This mobilization was massively

disturbed by the 27th Infantry Regiment, which suddenly appeared as a "Red" airborne regiment in the war mobilization area of the mechanized division. Only after sometimes heavy fighting and some surprises for the Blues (among other things, control of a basic supply point changed hands during the battles) did the Blues succeed in driving off and grinding down the air-landed enemy. On the Rhine River, meanwhile, the "Red" 6th Field Division was experiencing considerable difficulty with a stubbornly defending border brigade. After all of the bridges in the Reds' attack zones had been blown up, the defenders--in favorable terrain and from well-prepared positions--succeeded for a long time in hindering and delaying river-crossing operations. The border brigade was thus able to fully and completely carry out its mission as covering troops for the mobilizing 11th Mechanized Division; although some ground had to be yielded during Tuesday.



#### After "Ice Age," One and One-Half Days of Large-Scale Fighting

On Tuesday evening, the battles were "frozen" (thus the term "Ice Age"). The 6th Border Brigade was taken out of the exercise, and the 6th Field Division advanced into new positions as far as the Thur River.

Wednesday was then the actual main battle day for the 11th Mechanized Division: It was supposed to advance across various river-crossing points on the Thur in the direction of the Rhine. The opponent was supposed to be destroyed between the Thur and the Rhine and thrown back into Schaffhausen canton. In this case, the self-propelled artillery's fire was directed in concentrated fashion against the "Red" obstacles and strong points.



[Continued on following page]



Key:

1. Situation on Thursday 13 November 1986
2. The 6th Field Division as Army standby alert unit in Jura, Mittelland, Nied- and Obwalden, as well as Graubunden
3. Situation on Monday 17 November 1986, 1700 hours
4. Situation on Wednesday 19 November 1986, 0930 hours
5. RED
6. BLUE



This resulted in deep penetrations into the defensive positions of the 6th Field Division. The stubbornly defending infantrymen--who were supported by Centurion tanks, Model 68 tanks, and artillery--inflicted heavy losses upon the advancing Blue tank wedges. On Thursday, when the exercise was broken off, the battle lines between the Thur and the Rhine were very saw-toothed in shape, and an essentially stalemate situation was apparent, with local advantages for the Blue attackers.

#### Exercise Leaders Satisfied

During an initial evaluation before the press, both exercise directors--Corps Commander Josef Feldmann (overall direction) and Ernst Rueesch, canton government member from St Gallen (direction of civilian elements)--appeared satisfied with the overall course of the maneuver. Corps Commander Feldmann stressed in his comments that even the weak points discovered during the maneuver (in the cooperation between military and civilian staffs, for example) were especially instructive. With ... (words missing--Ed.) it is the mission of such a large exercise to discover existing shortcomings, in order to be able to get rid of them later. Feldmann described as being generally positive the war mobilization exercise at the beginning of the third "TRIDENT" week. Start-up difficulties associated with joint military operations using different types of weapons were overcome during the exercise.

The civilian exercise director, Ernst Rueesch, criticized among other things the partially unsatisfactory civil defense work. The reason for this was, first, the poor recruiting and insufficient training of the civil defense cadre. One should first of all endeavor to make use in the future of the leadership experience of former officers. Rueesch added that he was amazed by the learning ability and the improvisation talents of the civilian participants in the exercise.

#### Praise for NCO Corps

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Jan 87 p 4

[Article by Lt Gen Josef Feldmann: "Recognition for the NCO's; Gratifying Results of 'TRIDENT' Exercise"]

[Text] The "TRIDENT" exercise ended on 20 November without any significant accidents. The first results are already available and, seen as a whole, they can be described as gratifying. Additional facts will appear after a thorough evaluation of the exercise. The following are some results from the areas of special importance for the NCO.

The army has thus proved that it can carry out a mobilization from the standing position without any serious problems. Such a mobilization--in which the materiel and motor vehicle requisitioning detachments have only a very small lead-time ahead of the arriving troops--is only then promising of success when all units are thoroughly familiar with the mobilization process and the organization's positions. It is exactly here that the NCO plays a central role. He can make sure that everything is properly loaded and that

the immediate training within the army unit is carried out purposefully and quickly.

On the other hand, the army is still too inexperienced with guard duties in a situation involving indirect or covert warfare. Guard duty is not yet everywhere carried on with the necessary degree of seriousness. One still finds guard units which have not yet mastered the assignment given them, because of naive, too trusting behavior.

Even from the point of view of combat techniques, advances need to be made. So it must be considered that, through careless use of camouflage, one's own unit can be very significantly endangered by threat from the air. In this connection, it is again the NCO who can, through his example, decisively contribute to improvement. He must make sure that, in his area of responsibility, the correct thing is done, in order not to carelessly place personnel and materiel at risk.

If the exercise may be characterized as successful overall, much of the credit must be given to the chiefs at all levels, who carried out their duties in this demanding test with the will to fight, initiative, and imagination.

#### Mobile Antitank Warfare Stressed

Frauenfeld SCHWEIZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Jan 87 pp 10-13

[Article by Lt Col Reto Voneschen, St Gallen: "19 November 1986: 'Main Battle Day' for 'TRIDENT' Maneuver Participants; Stammheimer Depression: Tanks Against Infantry"]

[Text] "Yes, that is naturally unfair!" comments a frustrated armored infantryman of the Blue maneuver group from behind his woodpile about the umpire's decision to declare him "dead." From behind the next house corner comes the sound of the voices of the Red riflemen who were successful in this case: "Get out of here--or else we'll use the flamethrower on you again!" Next to this rustic maneuver scene, the battle of the Red defenders from the 6th Field Division against the Blue attackers from the 11th Mechanized Division goes on with undiminished intensity. The Reds try desperately to maintain possession of Waltalingen, at the entrance to the Stammheimer Depression; and, with equal stubbornness, the Blue tanks roll again and again against the defending company's positions.

After the battle between the Rhine and the Thur Rivers between the (Red) 6th Field Division and the (Blue) 6th Border Brigade had seesawed back and forth at the beginning of the final week of maneuvers, the battle situation as of 1800 hours on Tuesday was neutralized by the maneuver directors. The purpose of this measure was to regroup the 6th Field Division behind the Thur River, along with the 26th, 27th, and 28th Infantry Regiments, the 6th Artillery Regiment, and the 1st AA Regiment. As of 0500 hours Wednesday, the counter-attacks of the 11th Mechanized Division began from various bridgeheads on the Thur River. The goal of this Blue unit was to throw back the opponent which



had pushed forward through Schaffhausen into the Swiss area of the Rhine, and thus to hinder the forward movement of a--simulated--Red division of the following echelon. Thus, after playing the aggressors at the beginning of the week, the 6th Field Division now had to operate as defenders.

From this situation, there resulted by noon Thursday deep penetrations into the defenders' defensive positions. At the end of the maneuver, the front lines were strongly sawtoothed in shape; and, during the one and one-half "main battle days," there were at many places confrontations of the type described at the beginning. The defenders used an in-depth series of strong points and reserve positions against a powerfully mounted advance by the mechanized advance units. The advancing mechanized and motorized companies were aggressively attacked again and again. At sensitive spots, "Red" Centurion battle tanks also attacked in support of the defenders.

#### The Battle for Waltalingen

But back to Waltalingen: During Wednesday afternoon, Blue tanks supported by armored infantry advanced from the Thur River crossings in the direction of Waltalingen, at the entrance to the Stammheimer Depression. The tank-crossable plain around Oberstammheim and Unterstammheim represents a "runway" toward the Rhine at Diessenhofen, which is blocked only by a transverse range of higher elevations before Schlattlingen.

The reinforced rifle company in Waltalingen itself had only during the night of Tuesday to Wednesday been able to occupy its positions--therefore, no time was left to strengthen them. Improvisation was the trump suit everywhere. Right at the village entrance in Waltalingen, the lead tanks ran "into the hammer" of the defenders for the first time; within a few minutes, the riflemen were able to put three tanks and four self-propelled guns out of action. The Blue armored infantrymen had to abandon their vehicles--and surprised the defenders by outflanking them: Suddenly shots ring out and smoke grenades and petards explode at the rear entrance to the village. Although the company commander tries to regain control of the situation for "Red" by using an as yet uncommitted platoon, the situation ultimately becomes untenable for him.

#### The "Dead" Police Up the Battlefield

Meanwhile, at the road intersection in the middle of Waltalingen, the umpires gather the neutralized aggressors and defenders. Between two "Blue" self-propelled guns--"The little white flag on the antenna shows that the vehicles have been put out of action!" an umpire explains to an interested driver with FRG license plates on his car--several riflemen are sitting with their weapons, equipment, and helmets, leaning against a barn wall. "They wiped us out," explains the sergeant in charge of the squad to several listeners: "Just as we were crossing the village square, a self-propelled gun suddenly stood in front of us and a squad of armored infantrymen behind us...maneuver misfortune!"

"Now we at least have our peace for a little while!" one of the riflemen says happily--but not for long: A lieutenant orders the entire group to police up the battle site.

## Tank Duels at Great Distance

In spite of this, the continuing trip of the Blues who are ultimately victorious in Waltalingen is not frictionless: The tank columns--according to maneuver rules, they are not allowed to leave the road, even on this plain before Stammheim which would be advantageous for them--does not even move 300 meters: At the next farm, a cleverly-placed recoilless antitank cannon on a Jeep blocks their advance. The orange rotating lights again flit across the turrets of the aggressor's three lead tanks--"Direct hit! They are neutralized!" comes the laconic comment by an umpire.

At this instant, there is a flash at the edge of the village of Oberstammheim. A white cloud of thick smoke indicates the firing of a tank cannon--a Centurion belonging to the Red defenders attacks at long range. However, it is quickly silenced by the fire from at least five "Blue" Model 68 tanks. A second Centurion tries its luck from behind a barn--its rotating lights go on even before it can fire a second shot.

## One Against All

More luck is had by a third Centurion, which from a sawmill at the edge of Unterstammheim is fighting against the enemy advance on the road toward Waltalingen. Within a few minutes, the old battle tank "destroys" three much more modern adversaries. Through concealed change of position in the built-up area, the "Cent" escapes its enemy's fire and, for its part, blocks further movement of the entire enemy column.

"For me, the classic situation," says an umpire in the vicinity of the successful single Red tank: "The defenders are trying to gain time in order to reestablish themselves on the higher ground at the end of the plain with fresh troops and support weapons--and, at the moment, they are not doing badly at all..."

And in fact, an inspection on the high ground south of Schlattlingen shows a very hectic state: A mortar platoon is getting into position in a forest clearing; the gunners are working feverishly to sight their "tubes" in. The program calls for supporting fire for the hard-pressed defenders of Guntalingen and Oberstammheim. On a nearby hill, the commanding officer of an antitank guided missile company is, in the slowly approaching darkness, assigning deployment areas and fields of fire. On a field path, a heavily laden platoon is marching in the direction of Guntalingen. This platoon has the mission of occupying and holding a farm on the Waltalingen-Schlattlingen road.

## Blues Remain Stuck for Now

In the meantime however, the entire Blue lead company has reached and taken Waltalingen. Between the houses in the small village, tanks and self-propelled guns are moving into position. On the village street, a neutralized Red tank crew is asking at an opposition control point for information about the route to the collection point for neutralized vehicles.

The tank attack has gotten stuck for now. The tank crews are waiting on or next to their vehicles until it starts again. The armored infantrymen are busy cleaning out pockets of resistance along the road to Waltalingen, says one of them--another feels that it is more probable that they are stuck in the evening closing-time traffic. In any case, everyone is grateful for a little breather.

During the return trip along the attack axis, it then becomes visible that the rapid advance of the mechanized forces had to be paid for with very heavy "losses." Tanks and self-propelled guns with a white flag on the antenna are standing everywhere--and, on the other side of the plain, the Centurion still fires, now and then in the darkness, a couple of shots from the Stammheim sawmill toward the enemy.

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- END -